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Abstract
Over the years, egalitarian philosophers have made some challenging claims
about the nature of egalitarianism. They have argued that the Rawlsian lex-
imin principle is not an egalitarian idea; that egalitarian reasoning should
make us reject the Pareto principle; that the numbers should not count within
an egalitarian framework; that egalitarianism should make us reject the prop-
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1 Introduction
Over the years, egalitarian philosophers have made some challenging claims about
the nature of egalitarianism. They have argued that the Rawlsian leximin principle
is not an egalitarian position (McKerlie,1994), that egalitarian reasoning sometimes
should make us reject the Pareto principle (Nagel, 1991; Temkin, 2000a), that the
numbers should not count within an egalitarian framework (Nagel, 1979; Scanlon,
1998), that egalitarianism should make us reject the property of transitivity in nor-
mative reasoning (Temkin, 1987), that the Pigou-Dalton principle needs seriously
modification in order to capture the idea of egalitarianism (Temkin, 1993), and that
the intersection approach faces deep problems when applied to egalitarian reasoning
(Temkin, 1993).
Most economists would immediately reject these views. They find the Rawlsian
position the most obvious example of egalitarianism, the Pareto principle and tran-
sitivity beyond discussion, insensitivity to numbers plainly implausible (even within
an egalitarian framework), the Pigou-Dalton principle the hallmark of egalitarian-
ism, and the intersection approach extremely powerful and plausible. Why is it so?
Is it because most economists take political philosophy second-hand from a small
number of translators (Roemer, 1996, p. 10), and hence do not pay attention to the
many elaborate arguments underlying these challenging claims? Or is it because the
philosophers produce arguments that already are well-known (and maybe rejected)
in the economic literature?
A specific case in point is the recent philosophical debate on equality versus
priority. Many economists think that there is nothing new in this debate, whereas
philosophers feel that there is still a need for clarification. Is this because the philoso-
phers have missed the economic literature on equality or is it because the economists
do not capture the subtleties involved? As an economist, I will make an attempt to
answer this question, by studying in more detail some of the central philosophical
arguments in this debate. Actually, this project will move us beyond the question
about the usefulness of the distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism,
and into all the challenges listed above. But there will be more challenges left un-
touched. The philosophical literature on egalitarianism is full of suggestions and
ideas worthwhile of study, and it is obviously impossible to deal with all of them in
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one paper.1 Hence, I will have to narrow myself to what I consider the most pressing
points. And I hope to show that on these issues both philosophers and economists
can learn from each other, even though this does not necessarily imply a change of
viewpoint. What it probably will imply, though is that we have a more thorough
understanding of the kind of egalitarianism we eventually defend.
Egalitarians are concerned with a number of different inequalities; political, le-
gal, social, and economic (Nagel, 1979). However, in most of the present debate
on egalitarianism and prioritarianism, the framework has been narrowed down to
a comparison of distributions of well-being (Parfit, 1995).2 This is not an uncon-
troversial narrowing of the problem at hand, as stressed by Scanlon (1998) in his
discussion of the framework of contractualism.3
“Contractualism is not based on the idea that there is a ‘fundamental
level’ of justification at which only well-being (conceived in some par-
ticular way) matters and the comparison of magnitudes of well-being
is the sole basis for assessing the reasonableness of rejecting principles
of right and entitlement. Even though components of well-being figure
prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection, the idea of such a fun-
damental level is misleading on two counts. First, the claim that the
possibility of suffering a loss in well-being is something that has force
in moral argument is a substantive moral claim. By concealing or mini-
mizing this fact, the idea of a fundamental level has the effect of giving
these claims a privileged status over other moral considerations. In many
cases, gains and losses in well-being (relief from suffering, for example)
1By way of illustration, I will not discuss the time dimension of egalitarianism (see McKerlie
(1989, 1992, 1997, 2000) and Klemens (1997)), the non-identity problem (see Holtung (1999, forth-
coming), Persson (1999)) and how to cope with uncertainty within egalitarianism (see Broome
(1991, 2001), Fleurbaey (2001) and Rabinowicz (2001b)). For an overview of egalitarian reasoning,
see (among others) Barry (1989, 1995), Pojman (1997), Jason (1998), and Clayton and Williams
(2000). Kekes (1997) provides an interesting critical remark to egalitarianism..
2We will follow this route in the paper, and avoid a discussion of the appropriate understanding
of well-being (see for example Scanlon, 1993). Moreover, we will assume that there are no informa-
tional biases, such that we have a quantitative notion of well-being. This is in contrast to much of
the economic literature in this field, where the focus has been on the implications of informational
constraints on our understanding of egalitarianism; see Bossert and Weymark (1999) for a survey.
3See also Wolff (2000) for a critical view of this approach.
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are clearly the most relevant factors determining whether a principle
could or could not be reasonably rejected. And in some cases of this
kind questions of responsibility - such as whether the sufferer’s claim to
aid might be undermined by the fact that it was his or her own fault
- do not arise, either because it so obviously was not the person’s fault
or because it would not matter if it were. But...to identify a case as of
this kind is to place it within a specific moral framework, not to view it
without any moral assumptions” (pp. 214-215).
However, I will stay within this more narrow moral framework and consider how
undeserved, nonvoluntary inequalities of well-being in a society affect our evaluation
of various distributions.4 Moreover, I will assume that our framework satisfies a
minimal condition of anonymity, saying that the identity of an individual should
not influence on our reasoning.5
Most people care about these inequalities. But why? Scanlon (2000) suggests
that this is mainly due to the instrumental value of equality.
“I find that my reasons for favoring equality are in fact quite diverse,
and that most of them can be traced back to fundamental values other
than equality itself. The idea that equality is, in itself a fundamental
moral value turns out to play a surprisingly limited role in my reasons
for thinking that many of the forms of inequality which we see around
us should be eliminated” (p. 21).
A reduction in inequality may among other things alleviate suffering, the feeling
of inferiority, the dominance of some over the lives of others, and in many cases
these effects are of sufficient importance to motivate our concern for the alleviation of
inequality.6 But still most of us think that there are reasons for caring about equality
that are independent of its instrumental value? In section 2, I discuss different ways
4In other words, we only consider “welfaristic” theories, see Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark
(1984) for a more formal discussion.
5If we consider two alternatives x = (1, 2, 3) and y = (2, 1, 3), where each position reflects the
well-being of a particular person, then the minimal condition of anonymity is saying that we should
be indifferent between x and y.
6See Anderson (1999).
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of justifying the intrinsic value of equality, which also clarifies the general context of
the following analysis. The main objection to egalitarianism is analysed in section 3.
I reject this objection, and hence I believe that the intrinsic value of equality should
play a role in our social evaluations. But it needs to be combined with other values,
and section 4 contains a discussion of how this may be done. There are alternative
ways of defending an equal distribution, and in section 5 I provide a discussion of
prioritarianism and how this perspective relates to egalitarianism. It has also been
argued that a main implication of a concern for equality is that we should endorse
non-aggregative reasoning (though not necessarily the leximin principle), and this
view is explored in section 6. In section 7, I provide a critical discussion of some of
the basic features of the framework used in the discussion, whereas section 8 contains
concluding remarks.
2 The Intrinsic Value of Equality
Many people consider inequality intrinsically bad or unjust. Parfit (1995) names
these positions telic and deontic egalitarianism, respectively. But how can we defend
them? And what is the difference? Is it possible to be a telic egalitarian without being
a deontic egalitarian or vice versa? These questions turn out to be of importance
for our further discussion of the structure of egalitarianism, and hence we will look
into them more closely in this section.
Why should I be a telic egalitarian? In other words, why should I consider in-
equality bad? Some people suggest that this is a misplaced question:
“The teleological version of the principle claims that inequality is
itself something that is bad. Suppose that the claim is true. If it is true,
there is no reason to think that we will be able to explain the badness
of inequality in terms of the badness of other things, or in terms of some
other value that is not a matter of badness, any more than that we can
explain why suffering is bad in that way. There is no obvious reason
for saying that the claim that inequality is bad must be supported by
an argument while the claim that suffering is bad does not require that
support” (McKerlie, 1996, p. 277).
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However, there is an obvious reason for wanting to elaborate on the badness of
inequality, and McKerlie (op.cit., p. 278) observes this reason as well. It is a fact
that the claim that suffering is bad coheres strongly with our considered judgments,
whereas the claim that inequality is bad is more controversial.
But how can we add plausibility to the claim that inequality is bad? One way of
substantiating telic egalitarianism is to appeal to deontic egalitarianism, to wit to
argue that inequality is bad because it is unjust. But that is not the kind of badness
Parfit (1995) has in mind when he defines telic egalitarianism. He does not reject
the possibility of viewing injustice as a special kind of badness (p. 9), but argues
that we should define telic egalitarianism as the position claiming that inequality is
bad even in cases where the question of justice does not arise. If we link injustice
to wrong-doing (op.cit, p. 9), then the case that most clearly separates the two
views is the case where inequality cannot be avoided. Telic egalitarians would still
consider this inequality bad. Temkin (1993, p. 14) phrases this natural justice, but
means simply by this that something is bad if we would have some (pro tanto) moral
reason to alleviate the inequality if it were possible for us to do so.
Roughly speaking, there are two ways of understanding the badness of inequality.
In my view, the most promising approach is to take as a point of departure the
fundamental idea of equal moral status of people, and then argue that an equal
distribution is valuable because it captures this fundamental equality in at least
one relevant dimension.7 In other words, if x is more equal than y, then a telic
egalitarian can argue that this provides a reason to promote x (and not y) because
the distribution in x better expresses the moral equality of people. However, as
stressed by among others Nagel (1979) and Sen (1992), there are other ways of
expressing the moral equality of people, and we will return to the link between these
approaches and egalitarianism later in the paper. Presently, it is sufficient to notice
that telic egalitarianism is one plausible candidate in this respect.
Alternatively, we may understand the badness of inequality as a general claim
about value without linking this claim to the moral equality of people. This seems
to be the strategy of (among others) Parfit (1995) and McKerlie (1996). McKerlie
(1996, p. 275) suggests that inequality between people can be bad in the same way as
suffering or deprivation inside one life is bad. I have doubts about such an approach.
It makes sense to me to say that suffering is bad, without taking the moral equality
7See also Hausman (2001).
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of the agents in question as the point of departure. Actually, I think it is bad that
for example animals suffer, but I reject assigning the same moral status to animals
as to people. However, it would be strange to suggest that an equal distribution
of well-being among animals and people would be good a thing.8 In my view, any
defence of equality as a good thing - contrary to for example happiness - would have
to be motivated by the want of an appropriate expression of the moral equality of
people.
This view is closely related to the perspective outlined in Sen (1992, p. 17-19),
but with some important differences. Sen is concerned with the fact that it seems
like any plausible ethical theory of social arrangements will have to show equal
consideration at some level.9 I agree, and I believe that this reflects the view that
we cannot have a plausible ethical theory that completely ignores the moral equality
of people. In other words, to pay some attention to the moral equality of people is
a side constraint for any theory of this kind. But this does not imply that the
sole aim of any ethical theory would have to be to express the moral equality of
people. Nagel (1979, p. 112) and Kymlicka (1990, p. 44) suggest that this should
be the case, but I believe that to be too strong a claim about the appropriate form
of normative reasoning. It is important to clarify what are proper expressions of
8For the present purpose, it is not necessary to discuss whether it actually makes sense to
compare the well-being of people and animals.
9Kolm (1996, 1997) defends equal treatment of equals as a requirement of rationality. His
defence consists of two steps. First, he argues that this requirement or reason supports a fully
rational choice, because it provides justification for a unique outcome. Second, he argues that any
other reason justifying unequal treatment implies irrationality, by providing support for more than
one alternative. These alternatives are permuted states that are indistinguishable from the point
of view of justice, and hence there will be no reason for choosing one rather than the other. In
other words, we are forced to make an irrational choice. However, Kolm underlines that this only
provides a prima facie defence of equality.
“The above reasoning thus shows that there is a prima facie reason in favour of
equality and against inequality, which results from the very requirement of rationality.
Of course, for a given type of items, other reasons may also be present and relevant,
and they may in the end lead to another choice. These possible impediments consist
of the actual possibilities, and of the consideration of other valued aspects of the
situation that may either not refer to justice for these justiciables or imply ideal
equalities in other items” (1996, p. 38).
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moral equality. But there are other values that should be allowed to play a role
in normative reasoning. When I am concerned with suffering in a society, it is not
only because the distribution in this society (possibly) does not express the moral
equality of people. It is also because I think that suffering is bad more generally. And
I believe that this is why Sen (1992, p. 19) writes that “justification frequently [my
emphasis] takes the form of showing the integral connection of that inequality with
equality in some other important - allegedly more important space”, and does not
demand that this should always be the case. What I believe should always be the
case, though, is that any justification of inequality would have to include showing
the integral connection of that inequality with equality in some other space which
provides a sufficiently good expression of the moral equality of people and moreover
an account of what other values make us seek anything but the best representation
of moral equality.
Telic egalitarians, I shall say, value equality in the distribution because it reflects
the moral equality of people in a relevant way.10 But they accept the need to bal-
ance this aspect of goodness against other dimensions of the alternatives in question,
which we will return to in the next section. Presently, let us compare telic egalitarian-
ism with deontic egalitarianism. Deontic egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust,
because justice demands equal treatment of people that stand in a relationship of
justice (Parfit, 1995, p. 8).11 But what is really the difference here? First, is this an
all things considered claim about justice? Or should a deontic egalitarian be willing
to balance comparative justice against other dimensions of justice? In particular,
should efficiency considerations be part of an all things considered judgment about
justice? Some people strongly reject this possibility. By way of illustration, Cohen
(2000) agrees that it might be right to choose efficient institutions in society, but
he rejects the claim that these institutions are just. In his view, justice is equal
treatment, and there is no room for balancing this against efficiency considerations.
Others reject this position, and accept that justice can be the outcome of a more
general trade-off between considerations of efficiency and comparative justice. In
that case, deontic egalitarianism would be equivalent to telic egalitarianism, to wit
10Is it possible not to be a telic egalitarian? If we endorse the moral equality of people, then
how can we reject that the space of well-being is one relevant and valuable way of expressing this
equality?
11In this paper, I only consider the idea of a deontological constraint imposed on distributive
justice; not other kinds of deontological constraints.
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that it would capture one dimension of the consideration in question. However, if
we accept this approach, then how do we make a distinction between considerations
of justice and considerations of goodness? Or to put it in the language of Scanlon’s
(1998) view on value (which I assume also covers the value of justice). How do we
make a distinction between lower-order properties of goodness and justice?
“The alternative, which I believe to be correct, is to hold that be-
ing good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to
respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is
to have other properties that constitute such reasons. Since the claim
that some property constitutes a reason is a normative claim, this ac-
count also takes goodness or value to be non-natural properties, namely
the purely formal, higher-order properties of having some lower-order
properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind” (p. 97).12
Broome (1991) questions the possibility of making a distinction between reasons
relevant for justice and goodness respectively, and suggests a definition of teleology
by structure.
“Teleological ethics, then, says there is an ordering of acts that de-
termines the acts’ rightness. And this is actually enough to define tele-
ological ethics. Any ethical theory with this implication is teleological. I
am defining teleology, then, by its structure” (p. 12).
Hence, according to Broome, when we face a distributive conflict among people
standing in a relationship of justice, we are unable to make a further distinction
between considerations of justice and goodness?13 Of course, the fact that we (pos-
sibly) only view the distribution problem within a subgroup of all people establishes
that this is at most a partial consideration of overall goodness (which more generally
must take into account the conditions of all people). But within this group, Broome
argues that the just distribution is the best distribution (and vice versa). Scanlon
(1998) also seems to recognize the plausibility of this view.
12I will not have anything to say about whether these lower-order properties must have some
subjective conditions or not. As I see it, nothing in this paper depends on our view on this issue.
13To establish when people stand in a relationship of justice is a difficult issue in itself, which
will not be discussed in this paper.
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“Indeed, one may wonder whether, once it is recognized that a teleo-
logical conception of value can assign intrinsic value to actions as well as
to their consequences, and that this value need not be impartial or addi-
tive, there is any content left to the bare idea of a teleological structure.
It may seem that no significant difference remains between a teleological
conception of value and a non-telelogical structure” (p. 81).
As I see it, if we move beyond Cohen’s view of the concept of justice, the most
fundamental difference between deontic and telic egalitarianism is that deontic egal-
itarianism takes as a point of departure that some people stand in a relationship of
justice whereas telic egalitarianism is derived from the idea that we are all morally
equal. Hence, telic egalitarianism applies more widely. This is also acknowledged by
Parfit (1995), who argues that the main difference between these two approaches is
with respect to scope. But I’ll suggest that this difference is of less importance than
frequently assumed, because it is very hard to see that anyone can be deontic egali-
tarians without being telic egalitarians (and vice versa). If you acknowledge that an
equal distribution should enter into your consideration about how to treat people
standing in a relationship of justice to yourself, then how can you avoid endorsing
the claim that more generally equality is good because in at least one relevant way
it expresses the moral equality of people (see also McKerlie, 1996, p. 277)? Similarly,
if you accept the general claim of telic egalitarians, then how can you reject that
equal treatment should be considered just in at least one respect?
However, I am not suggesting that the two views coincide (Parfit, 1995, p. 13).
They may, but that is not my point (and would depend on when we think people
stand in a relationship of justice). What I reject is the claim of Parfit (op.cit., p. 18)
that it is important to determine whether you are a telic egalitarian or a deontic
egalitarian. In my view, if you are an egalitarian, you are both deontic and telic
egalitarian. Moreover, I believe like Temkin (1993) that telic egalitarianism has the
upper hand.14
14McKerlie (1996) disagrees:
“If the existence of the duty could be explained only by the badness of the
resulting inequality then the deontological view would presuppose the teleological
view. But I think that we can understand acknowledging the duty without explaining
it in that way. We might object to treating people in different and unequal ways just
because we think this is an unfair way to treat them. The differential treatment
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“My own view is that most concern about social inequality must ulti-
mately ride piggyback on concern about natural inequality. It is difficult
to see why social inequality would be bad per se if natural inequality
were not” (p. 15).
In any case, in the rest of the paper I will not try to make a distinction between
telic and deontic egalitarianism, and simply refer to egalitarianism as the formal
reason saying that equality is intrinsically valuable within the present context. By
doing this, I assume that any objection to telic egalitarianism is an objection to
deontic egalitarianism as well, because it undermines a value that any deontic egal-
itarian necessarily needs to defend. In particular, when we now turn to the levelling
down objection, I reject the suggestion by Parfit (1995, p. 18) that we may avoid
this objection by moving from telic to deontic egalitarianism.
3 The Levelling Down Objection
An egalitarian supports the following principle of equality.
The Weak Principle of Equality: If one alternative is more equal than another,
it is better in one respect.
However, it has been argued that this principle faces a serious problem, which
Parfit (1995) names the levelling down objection. A reduction in inequality can take
place by harming the better off in society without improving the situation of the
worse off. But this cannot be good in any respect, contrary to the claim of the
weak principle of equality. Hence, according to the objection, inequality cannot be
intrinsically bad.
Temkin (1993, 2000) argues that the force of this argument is taken from a
principle he names the slogan.
The Slogan: One situation cannot be worse (or better) than another situation in
any respect if there is no one for whom it is worse (or better) in any respect.
will cause a difference between their lives, but we are not compelled to think that
the difference is bad” (p. 289). Of course, we are not compelled to think that the
difference is bad all things considered, but I find it hard to see that we should not
find this difference bad in one respect if we think it is unfair!
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On the basis of the slogan, we can defend the levelling down objection. In order
to do this, however, we need to make a further assumption. We need to assume
that it is possible to level down the better off without benefitting the worse off in
any respect. If it is always the case that inequality is bad for the worse off in some
respect, then it is not possible to level down without improving the situation for
some in some respect. Consequently, the levelling down objection looses its force.
If levelling down is good for some people in some respect, it seems trivial to argue
that levelling down is generally good in some respect. In any case, there is no longer
any link to the slogan.
Parfit (1995, p. 29) argues that the mere fact of inequality is not in itself bad for
the people who are worse off.
“The mere fact of inequality is not, in itself, bad for the people who
are worse off. Such inequalities may be naturally unfair. And it would
of course be better for these people if they themselves were better off.
But it would not be better for them if, without any effects on them, the
other people were just as badly off” (p. 29).
I find this perspective plausible. It is hard to see that inequality should be bad
for the worse off (in any respect) if they are not aware of this inequality.15 At the
15This might not be the case if we talk about the badness of inequality following from unjust
treatment. Even if we are unaware of unjust treatment, we might argue that it is bad for people.
In order to defend such a view in detail, we would have to outline a theory of self-interest. But my
general view is that if we move beyond the idea that mental states or unrestricted desire fulfillment
is all that matters for people, then we would end up on a confirmative note. Relations to other
people are valuable beyond the fact that we desire it or attain good feelings from it (Scanlon,
1998, p. 125). It is valuable to have good friends, not only to feel that you have good friends. It
is valuable to be treated justly, not only to feel that you are treated justly. Possibly, that is what
Broome (1991) has in mind when he argues that unjust treatment is plainly an individual harm.
“Unfairness, as I have described it, is plainly an individual harm. There is un-
fairness if someone’s claim is satisfied less than in proportion to its strength. Since a
claim is a duty owed particularly to the person, the unfairness is plainly suffered by
that person. If, say, people have equal claims to the satisfaction of needs, and some
have their needs less well satisfied than others do, then those people are suffering
unfairness” (p. 198).
Temkin (2000a) is not supportive of this line of reasoning. He argues that this will save the
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same time, egalitarians claim that this inequality makes the alternative bad in one
respect, and hence we have a conflict with the slogan.
Should this objection cause us to give up egalitarianism or the slogan?16 Temkin
(2000a) argues at length that what we should give up is the slogan. Even though
I endorse his general conclusion, I have trouble with some of the premises of this
discussion. First, Temkin (op.cit., p. 11) suggests that the slogan underlies many
arguments in economics. I am not sure about that. Actually, I have not seen any
slogan only by robbing it of its teeth.
“Importantly, one might preserve the Slogan by adopting an Objective List The-
ory about self-interest and including on it those moral ideals to which people are
committed. Specifically, with a broad enough Objective List Theory, any case in
which one outcome is better or worse than another in any respect will also be a case
in which there is someone for whom that outcome is better or worse in some respect.
But...such a move will save the Slogan by robbing of its teeth. In particular, if it is an
open question what factors or ideals will appear on the correct Objective List about
self-interest - as it surely must be given the present state of argument about such
issues - one cannot appeal to the Slogan to undermine any particular positions. After
all, to do so would simply beg the question against whether the positions in question
belong on the correct Objective List Theory about self-interest. Thus, even if the
Slogan could be defended given a sufficiently broad Objective List Theory about self-
interest, it would not serve any particular conclusions for which it has been invoked”
(pp. 27-28).
But is it a problem that we save the slogan by robbing it of its teeth? If our reasoning is correct,
then we don’t need to attack the slogan in order to undermine the levelling down objection in cases
involving social injustice. In these cases, unjust treatment is always bad for people, and hence it
is not possible to level down without improving the situation for some in some respect. Of course,
this would also be true if we not only levelled down the better off to the level of the worse off but
further worsened the situation for everyone such that the worse off - all things considered - were
worse off than before the change. Even in this case of equality would the situation improve for the
worse off in one respect, to wit with respect to justice.
However, this is not to endorse the view of Broome (1991), who argues that if injustice is bad
then it is bad because it is bad for someone. My argument is that unjust treatment should be
considered bad for people, but that does not rule out the possibility that unjust treatment can be
bad beyond the fact that it is bad for people. I think it can, and this fact may be part of an argument
that challenges a stronger (and probably more interesting) version of the slogan well known from
economics. On the relationship between levelling down and our understanding of well-being, see
also Wollf (2000).
16Or maybe revise the slogan slightly, see Holtung (1998).
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economist explicitly supporting the slogan. Of course, this might be due to the fact
that economists usually do not approach the problem at this level of analysis, but
I doubt it. I suspect that most economists support what Broome (1991, p. 155)
names the democratic version of the Pareto principle (if everyone prefers the first
of two alternatives to the second, then the first should come about), and hence do
not commit themselves to any particular view on the goodness of the alternatives.
And I believe that most of them would be more than willing to reject the slogan
without accepting that this should cause them to change their view on the Pareto
principle. Second, Temkin (2000a) suggests that the difference principle of Rawls
often is criticized by use of the slogan.
“When [the difference principle] allows vast gains for the better-off
to promote tiny gains for the worse-off, it is often defended by invoking
the Slogan” (p. 12).
Is that really the case? To my knowledge, most people defend this by reference
to the Pareto principle, and nothing else. And the same can be said about Temkin’s
reference to the theories of Nozick, Locke, and Scanlon, where Temkin argues that
the force of these arguments follows from the implications that “if no one is worsened
by the exchange, it cannot be bad” (op. cit., p. 12), “as long as there is no one for
whom acquiring the property is worse, it cannot be bad” (op. cit., p. 13), and “there
is nothing intrinsically bad about violating apparent rights when this benefits some
and harms no one” (op. cit., p. 15). But these are all appeals to the Pareto principle
and nothing else. Hence, only if there is a close link between the Pareto principle and
the slogan is it reasonable to claim that the slogan (and not the Pareto principle) is
a powerful, modern-day, Ockham’s razor that carves out the domain of moral value
(Temkin, 2000).
Let me elaborate by looking at the discussion in Temkin (1993, pp. 256-257),
where different versions of the slogan are considered. One of these versions is actually
equivalent to the Pareto principle, and Temkin explains here why he thinks the
Pareto principle (or this version of the slogan) derives its appeal from the version of
the slogan stated above.
“After all, if one situation could be worse than another in some re-
spect, even if there was no one from whom it was worse in even one
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respect (and hence all things considered), then why couldn’t it be worse
all things considered? Presumably the one situation would be worse than
the other, all things considered, if there was no respect in which it was
better, or if the respect(s) in which it was better were not sufficient to
outweigh the respect(s) in which it was worse. Surely there is no a priori
reason to rule out such possibilities if [the slogan] is false” (p. 257).
But there is no reason to rule out such possibilities even if the slogan is true!
Still, there will be cases where one alternative is better all things considered for
everyone, but worse in many respects. By way of illustration, consider a case where
everyone is better off if we allow treatment that partly deprives some people’s self-
respect. In this case, the alternative is worse in one respect overall, and not only
worse for some people in one respect. Hence, we need to weigh the respect(s) in
which it is worse against the respect(s) in which it is better. The intuition of the
Pareto principle is that in this exercise we should use the same weights as the
people involved, and hence conclude that (in this case) unequal treatment should
be endorsed. But this has nothing to do with the intuition covered by the slogan,
which is that an alternative cannot be worse in some respect if it is worse for no one
in any respect. Of course, if the slogan is wrong (which I think it is), then we have a
set of cases where we cannot adopt the weights used by the individuals (because the
new alternative is not worse for them in any respect). And it might be the case that
in these situations we should reject the Pareto principle on the basis of this badness
that is not reflected in the life of any person. Hence, the slogan may contribute to
undermine the Pareto principle. But that is not the same as saying that the Pareto
principle derives its appeal from the slogan. Even if the slogan were true would there
be a need for justifying the way the Pareto principles balances gains and losses. And
I will argue that the intuitive appeal of this principle is based on how it solves these
cases, and not the cases covered by the slogan.
I believe that some version of the Pareto principle is the modern-day, Ockham’s
razor of moral reasoning, and in the next section I will discuss whether we should give
up this principle on the basis of egalitarian reasoning.17 In any case, I do not believe
that we should give up the egalitarian perspective on the basis of the levelling down
objection, as long as we define egalitarianism as saying that more equality makes
17There might be other ideals (not discussed in this paper) which should make us give up the
Pareto principle, for example proportional justice. See Broome (1991) and Temkin (2000a).
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society better in one respect. And I doubt, contrary to what some writers claim (see
for example Parfit, 1995, p. 17 and McKerlie, 1994, p. 27), that many people are
moved by this objection. I think that most people acknowledge the fact that an equal
distribution is better in at least one dimension, even though it is worse for everyone.
What they find hard to accept is that the badness of an unequal distribution should
ever make us reject an alternative were everyone is better off.
4 Pluralist Egalitarianism
Let us assume that we reject the levelling down objection, and assign intrinsic value
to equality. How should such a view be combined with other values in an all things
considered evaluation? In particular, how should we combine this view with what
we will name the weak principle of personal good.18
The Weak Principle of Personal Good: If one alternative is at least as good as
another for everyone and definitely better for someone, it is better in one respect.
In general, there are three ways of combining the weak principle of personal good
with the weak principle of equality if we want to establish a complete ranking of
alternatives. First, we might assign absolute priority to the weak principle of personal
good, which implies that we endorse the general principle of personal good.
The General Principle of Personal Good: If one alternative is at least as good as
another for everyone and definitely better for someone, it is better.
Why are we egalitarian in this case? Because we accept that an increase in the
well-being of the better off that does not make it worse for the worse off is worse
in one respect, to wit there is more inequality. But we reject balancing these two
dimensions in an all things considered evaluation.
Alternatively, we might assign absolute priority to the weak principle of equality.
But this seems entirely implausible. Such a position would support the view that a
situation where everyone has equally terrible lives is better - all things considered -
than a situation where everyone lives good lives but there is minimum of inequality.
18The principle of personal good was introduced in Broome (1991). Structurally, it is equivalent
to the Pareto principle, but it is stated in the space of individual good and not in the space of
individual preferences. In this paper, we will refer to this principle as the general principle of
personal good, in order to distinguish it from the weak principle of personal good.
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Finally, we could support a view where we make trade-offs between the weak prin-
ciple of equality and the weak principle of personal good. This seems to be the most
common view in the literature. Parfit (1995) discusses this approach in some detail,
where he makes a distinction between strong egalitarians and moderate egalitari-
ans. Strong egalitarians sometimes violate the general principle of personal good,
whereas moderate egalitarians never do that. Moderate egalitarians never think that
the badness of inequality outweighs the gain in well-being from a move endorsed by
the weak principle of personal good. Is that plausible? McKerlie (1996) does not
think so.
“There is a value - the value of a decrease in inequality - to weigh
against the harm done to people, and there is no reason to think that
this value would always be less important than the harm” (p. 287).
However, as observed by Parfit, there is a structural fact that adds plausibility to
the claim of moderate egalitarians, namely that there can be much more inequality
only if the better-off people gain a great deal. Hence, there are no cases where a small
gain in well-being is accompanied by a large increase in the badness of inequality.
And on the basis of this fact we may argue that the gain in well-being always
outweighs the badness from increased inequality.
Broome (1991), however, does not endorse this kind of defence of the general
principle of personal good.
“The basis of this claim is the following argument. Suppose the slogan
is false. Then there could be two situations A and B such that A is not
worse than B for anyone in any respect, and yet in some respect A is
worse than B. According to the principle of personal good, since A is not
worse for anyone than B, A is not worse than B. Since it is worse than
B in some respect, there must be some other respect in which it is better
than B, and this must be enough to outweigh the respect in which it is
worse. So the fact that A is not worse than B depends on the fortunate
presence of a sufficiently important respect in which it is better than B.
And how could we always rely on such a fortunate coincidence? If there
can be cases where one alternative is worse than another in some respect,
despite not worse for anybody in any respect, then surely there can also
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be cases where one alternative is worse than another tout court, despite
not being worse for anybody in any respect. These would be cases in
which the fortunate balancing respect did not appear. If the slogan is
false, then, the truth of the [general] principle of personal good depends
on a fortunate coincidence, which is surely undependable” (p. 183).
Hence, Broome rejects this kind of defence of moderate egalitarians. In his view,
egalitarians should reject the slogan and accept the general principle of personal
good, but this acceptance should not be the result of any balancing procedure.
“She [that is the egalitarian] does, however, accept the [general] prin-
ciple of personal good; she believes general good to be an increasing
function of individual good. And just because she rejects the slogan, she
will not feel any less secure in this principle. She believes, as a matter of
principle, that general good depends only, and positively, on the good of
individuals. In comparing A and B, she does not think that fortunately
there is some respect in which A is better than B, which cancels out the
respect in which it is worse. She does think inequality is a bad thing, and
she thinks it a communal bad in the sense I have spelled out. She does
think A is worse than B in one respect, though it is worse for nobody.
But this respect is not one that has independent force in determining
the general goodness of alternatives. General good depends only on the
good of individuals” (p. 184).
I cannot find Broome’s line of reasoning convincing. What does it mean that we
accept this as a matter of principle? Why does not the badness of inequality have
independent force? Broome suggests that the notion of a ‘respect’ is too equivocal to
hang one’s argument on. But why is it so? I find a ‘respect’ well-defined, it is a moral
reason that counts in favour of one of the alternatives. So I think that the claim of
Broome needs further elaboration to work as a defence of the general principle of
personal good.
However, I share Broome’s scepticism to moderate egalitarianism as the outcome
of a balancing procedure of this kind. I don’t think we should balance the two
principles in cases of conflict. In my view, we should assign absolute priority to the
weak principle of personal good in all conflicts with the weak principle of equality.
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And the reason for this is that the weak principle of personal good provides a more
fundamental expression of the moral equality of people than the weak principle of
equality. The weak principle of personal good expresses moral equality according
to the principle of unanimity, which by many have been considered an essential
requirement of impartiality (Brink, 1993, p. 252). Nagel (1979, 1991) provides the
clearest defence of an interpretation of moral equality in terms of unanimity.
“Oddly enough, egalitarianism is based on a more obscure conception
of moral equality than either of the less egalitarian theories....Something
close to unanimity is being invoked...The essence of such a criterion is
to try in a moral assessment to include each person’s point of view sepa-
rately, so as to achieve a result which is in a significant sense acceptable
to each person involved or affected” (Nagel, 1979, pp. 116-123).
An unequal distribution where everyone is better off compared to an equal dis-
tribution is in a highly significant sense acceptable to all.19 However, this does not
19However, we should have in mind that our discussion of these cases is extremely sensitive to our
understanding of well-being, as stressed by Wolff (2000). If we have a rather narrow interpretation
of well-being, then it might make sense to say that people find an equal distribution of well-being
acceptable even though everyone is worse off compared to an unequal distribution. This is the kind
of view suggested by Norman (1998).
“[E]quality at a lower level of well-being might be seen as preferable to inequality
at a higher level of well-being for everyone. Imagine an egalitarian community at a
fairly low level of economic development whose members, though not experiencing
great hardship or absolute poverty, have a simple life style. Given the opportunity
of economic development which would make them all better off but introduce sub-
stantial inequalities, they might prefer to remain less prosperous but equal. I am not
thinking here of the typical attendant evils of industrialisation such as crime and
social conflict and environmental pollution which would enable us to explain their
choice by saying that they would not really be better off. I am supposing that they
would acknowledge that they would be better off with economic development, but
still prefer equality...It is a preference for certain kinds of social relations. They may
fear that, with greater inequality, they will become more distanced from one an-
other...the more prosperous among them will be disdainful and supercilious and the
less prosperous will become more servile and more resentful, and they will no longer
be united by shared experience and a shared condition” (p. 51).
In that case, we need to include the preference for social relations in our understanding of well-
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mean that moral equality is expressed in all significant dimensions of the problem. If
there is more inequality, then the distribution of well-being fails to reflect the moral
equality of people. And that is bad. But this badness is of secondary importance
compared to the significance of expressing moral equality according to the princi-
ple of unanimity. In other words, the weak principle of personal good should have
absolute priority in a conflict with the weak principle of equality, which is why we
should always endorse the general principle of personal good.
Hence, I endorse the claim of egalitarians that inequality in the distribution is
bad because it does not reflect the moral equality of people. But I believe there
is a more fundamental way of expressing this moral equality, to wit by the weak
principle of personal good, and on the basis of this egalitarians should accept the
general principle of personal good. This does not mean that I endorse the claim of
Broome (1991) that the badness of inequality does not have independent force in the
determination of the goodness of alternatives. On the contrary, potentially I believe
the badness of inequality to have tremendous force in cases of conflict, an issue I
now turn to.
To see this, however, we have to clarify somewhat further our understanding of
the concept of inequality. It is trivial to say that equality is better than inequality.
But we need more than this. We need to compare the badness of different unequal
distributions, in order to see how the weak principle of equality can be used to solve
cases of conflict. There are many suggestions on this issue, but I will take as the
point of departure the claim of Vallentyne (2000) that:
“[a]ll plausible conceptions of equality hold that, where perfect equal-
ity does not obtain...any benefit (no matter how small) to a worst off
person that leaves him/her still worst off person has priority (with re-
spect to equality promotion) over any benefit (no matter how large) to
a best off person” (p. 1).20
being in order to defend the weak principle of personal good on the basis of a concern for unanimity.
As a response to such a move, Wolff (2000, p. 7) remarks that one of the main implications of a
discussion of the structure of egalitarianism may be that we get a better understanding of the
appropriate interpretation of the concept of well-being.
20See Temkin (1993) for a general philosophical discussion of the concept of equality, and on how
this condition can be justified on the basis of individual complaints. Persson (forthcoming) and
Rabinowicz (2001) provide some further reflection on Temkin’s framework. Sen and Foster (1997)
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This is a very weak claim about the concept of equality. But it turns out to have
strong implications, if we accept some further conditions on normative reasoning.
However, first we should notice an immediate consequence. If we assign absolute
priority to equality promotion in cases of conflict, a position we can name strict
moderate egalitarianism, then we would have to accept a discontinuous all things
considered evaluation of the alternatives. No matter how much the best off person
gains in a conflict with the worst off person, we should assign absolute priority to
the worst off person on the basis of equality promotion. I stress this rather obvious
implication for two reasons. First, it shows that in a discussion of egalitarianism, it
is not at all trivial to assume that the all things considered relation is continuous.
Economists often do that (see for example Ebert, 1987). Second, it indicates the
close link between equality promotion and Rawlsian reasoning.
What about cases where there is a conflict between the worst off and people who
are not the best off? Do we still have to give absolute priority to the worst-off if we
are to promote equality? McKerlie (1994) does not think so.21
“A change might give a small benefit to the very worst-off group, but
cause a much larger loss for other groups that are also badly-off. The
difference principle will support the change. Some people will think that
the change would be wrong. If we oppose the change, we are choosing
the better outcome in utilitarian terms, but we are also preventing an
increase in inequality and avoiding serious harm to people who are badly
off. If we find this objection convincing we will decide that the difference
principle does not explain our distinctively egalitarian moral judgments”
(pp. 28-29, my emphasis).
Consider x=(2,10,100) and y=(1,100,100). This is the kind of case McKerlie has
in mind. And many well-known inequality measures would provide support for the
conclusion that there is more inequality in x than y. But it is not obvious that we
should accept this conclusion. There is a very good reason for arguing in favour
of the opposite view. In this case, the reduction in the well-being of the second
worst off (when moving from y to x) causes a decrease in the distance between the
second worst off and the worst off which is equal to the increase in distance between
and Cowell (2000) provide overviews of the economic approach to inequality measurement.
21Actually, Rawls (1974, p. 648) expresses a similar view.
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the second worst off and the best off. Which is worse? Of course, there are several
plausible answers (Temkin, 1993). But to me it does not seem too implausible to
argue that the isolation of the worst off at the bottom, from the point of inequality,
outweighs the gain of having the second worst off getting equal to the best off.
Be that as it may. There is another problem here as well. If we accept the claim
of transitivity in normative reasoning, then it turns out that we have to endorse
the following maximin rule within any framework satisfying the general principle of
personal good and the minimal restriction imposed on the concept of equality by
Vallentyne.22
Maximin: If the level of well-being in the worst off position is strictly higher in
one alternative than another, it is better all things considered.
Consequently, if we think (as McKerlie) that the maximin rule sometimes violates
equality promotion, then we have an impossibility result. In that case, it is not
possible to combine equality promotion and the general principle of personal good in
a reasonable framework satisfying transitivity. Some people, like Temkin (1993) and
Kolm (2000), reject an a priori assumption about transitivity, and I will elaborate on
this issue in section 7. However, for those who accept this condition as a requirement
of consistency, the maximin rule seems to be the only option.
Moreover, if we are willing to accept a further restriction on the concept of equal-
ity, then we can establish a complete link between strict moderate egalitarianism
and the more general leximin principle.23 Vallentyne (2000, p. 6) argues that equal-
ity is increased if there is a decrease in the well-being of a person above the mean
who stays above the mean, an increase in the well-being of a person below the mean
who stays below the mean, and no changes occur elsewhere in the distribution.24 If
we accept this suggestion, defends equality promotion in all cases of conflict and the
22Notice that this condition is not saying that we are indifferent between cases where the worst
off attains the same level of well-being. That would violate the general principle of personal good.
The maximin rule is only saying that in cases of conflict involving the worst off, we should assign
absolute priority to the worst off if we are to promote equality. In any other conflict, the rule is
silent. See Tungodden (2000 a,b) for a detailed discussion of this result.
23The more general leximin principle states that if the worst off is indifferent, then we should
assign absolute priority to the second worst off, and so on. For a critical discussion of the link
between the leximin principle and the difference principle of Rawls, see Tungodden (1999). See
also Van Parijs (2001) for a thorough discussion of the difference principle.
24This is also suggested by Temkin (1993, p. 25).
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general principle of personal good, then we have a characterisation of the leximin
principle within any framework satisfying transitivity and anonymity.25
In sum, I believe this shows that there is a very close link between equality
promotion and Rawlsian reasoning. This has also been suggested by Barry (1989,
pp 229-234), who recognizes that equality promotion should imply absolute priority
to the worst off in a conflict with the best off. However, Barry’s approach has been
heavily criticized by McKerlie (1994).
”Barry’s argument breaks down at the last stage, when he tries to
explain why we should choose the particular Pareto superior outcome
that is best for the worst-off group...Any argument from equality to the
difference principle faces the same problem. If we care about equality
it is plausible to think that we object to inequality between any two
groups for its own sake. How can we get from this starting-point to the
conclusion that we should assess inequality only in terms of its effect on
the worst off” (pp. 32-33).
If we accept transitivity in normative reasoning, then I have shown how we can
get from this starting-point to the leximin principle, and hence why the leximin
principle is an extremely plausible representation of strict moderate egalitarianism.
Some readers will probably still reject, arguing that the leximin principle neverthe-
less violates equality promotion in some cases of conflict. Let me elaborate somewhat
on how we can deal with this objection in relation to the maximin part of the leximin
principle.
There are three possible responses (within a transitive framework). First, we
may argue that the reader should give up his or her present ideas about how to
measure the badness of inequality. The maximin result is based on a restriction
of the concept of equality which no one can reject, and hence we should assign
this restriction much more weight than our present intuitions about cases where we
think that the maximin criterion violates equality promotion. In these cases, there
are always reasonable counterarguments pointing in the direction suggested by the
maximin principle, and thus there should be no doubt that we have to give the
maximin approach the upper hand if we are to revise our understanding of equality
on the basis of this result.
25See Tungodden (2000a) for a further discussion of this result.
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But we do not have to revise our conception of equality. There are two alternative
interpretations. On the one hand, we can accept that this result shows us that the
maximin principle is the most promising coherent framework that can be established
if we assign absolute priority to equality promotion, because it is derived from our
most firm believes about equality. But we may still think that this framework is im-
perfect, and that it sometimes violates equality promotion. Let me explain. Assume
that the basic restriction on equality (that we all accept) tells us that x is better
than y, and moreover that the general principle of personal good tells us that y is
better than z. If we want a transitive relation, then we have to conclude that x is
better than z. However, we may still insist that z is more equal than x, but accept
that it is not possible to capture all our views on equality within a single coherent
framework.26 And we may think that the best among the many possible imperfect
but coherent frameworks is the one that can be derived from our strongest believes
about equality. On the other hand, we may reject this view as well, arguing in favour
of a broader “second-best analysis” within the set of imperfect and coherent frame-
works. We may think that there are other things than the violation of our strongest
believes that should be taken into account in such an analysis. For example, if we
have a number of other reasonably strong believes about equality promotion which
all go against the maximin principle, then we might be willing to accept a viola-
tion of our strongest believes in order to satisfy these others believes. Hence, the
result needs to be carefully interpreted. My favorite interpretation, though, is that
we should revise our views on equality and accept the view that the maximin (and
leximin) principle always promotes equality in cases of conflict.
There is another way of establishing an interesting link between equality promo-
tion and the leximin principle, and that is by imposing the separability condition
on the all things considered evaluation. Separability in the all things considered
evaluation implies that the level of well-being of people who are indifferent does
not influence our ranking of the alternatives. When doing this, it is important to
keep in mind the distinction between a reason and an all things considered evalu-
ation. It is clear that the egalitarian reason violates the claim of separability, but
this does not imply that an egalitarian all things considered relation would have
26In other words, equality promotion is a pro tanto reason for preferring z to x, which does not
loose its reason-giving force even if accept the framework where we all things considered conclude
that x is better than z. For a further elaboration on this perspective, see our discussion of Hurley’s
(1989) defence of transitivity in section 7.
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to do the same. First, no moderate egalitarian framework pays attention to the
non-separability feature of the egalitarian reason in cases where there is no conflict.
By way of illustration, consider the alternatives x = (5, t, t) and y = (10, t, t). Any
moderate egalitarian framework concludes that y is better than x (from the general
principle of personal good), whereas the egalitarian reason violates separability by
saying that (from the point of equality) x is better than y when t < 5 and y is better
than x when t > 10.
More importantly, a moderate egalitarian framework may violate the non-
separability feature of egalitarianism in all cases of conflict as well. To see this,
consider an example suggested by Broome (2001). We have four alternatives
c = (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2), d = (4, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2), e = (2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), and
f = (4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). In this example, there is an egalitarian reason for preferring
c to d which is not present in a comparison between e and f , to wit that c is equal
and e is not. And again this reason violates the claim of separability, because it pays
attention to the level of well-being of indifferent people. But do we have to pay at-
tention to this reason within every plausible egalitarian framework? We do not. By
way of illustration, we may defend moderate egalitarianism within the framework
of Nagel (1979, 1991), where we seek a result which is acceptable to each person
involved. Within such a framework, we can safely ignore the indifferent people, and
moreover we may argue that priority among the affected people should be assigned
on the basis of relative positions. In that case, we have a separable strict moderate
egalitarian framework.
In such a framework, our concern is to promote equality within the group of people
involved in the conflict. But that implies that equality promotion demands absolute
priority to the worse off in all conflicts where only two persons are involved, which
is a condition that has been suggested (in the framework of an all things considered
relation) by Hammond (1976, 1979).
The Hammond Equity Condition: If there is a decrease in well-being of a better
off person and an increase in well-being of a worse off person (without any reversal
of the relative positions) and everyone else is indifferent, then the new alternative
is better.
And as shown by Hammond, this is all we need to characterise the leximin
principle. Notice that the fact that we aim at promoting equality within the group
of people involved in a conflict does not imply that we do not value overall equality.
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Within such a framework, we only have to argue that overall equality is of secondary
importance. The essential part of this perspective is to aim at acceptability within
the group of people involved in the conflict, and we do that better by focusing on
equality promotion within this group than on promoting overall equality (if these
two aims should ever be in conflict!).
In the philosophical literature, there has been considerable concern about another
principle that might be of importance for egalitarians, to wit the weak principle of
well-being.
The Weak Principle of Well-Being: If one alternative has more total well-being
than another, it is better in one respect.
Of course, the weak principle of well-being is in line with the weak principle
of personal good. But it is a much stronger principle that also covers all cases of
conflict, and hence is sometimes in direct conflict with the weak principle of equality.
Thus we need to clarify how to balance these two principles. In this discussion, we
will for the sake of simplicity sometimes refer to the weak principle of well-being as
utilitarian reasoning, since this principle is structurally equivalent to the utilitarian
perspective.
Before we enter into the problem of balancing, though I believe there is a more
fundamental question to ask. If you are an egalitarian, then why should you care
about the weak principle of well-being? If we read Parfit (1995) on this, it becomes
clear that he does not make a distinction between the weak principle of personal
good and the weak principle of well-being.
“Suppose next that the people in some community could all be ei-
ther (1) equally well off, or (2) equally badly off. The [weak] Principle
of Equality does not tell us that (2) would be worse. This principle is
about the badness of inequality; and, though it would be clearly worse
if everyone were equally worse off, our ground for thinking this cannot
be egalitarian.
To explain why (2) would be worse, we might appeal to [the weak
principle of well-being ]...When people would be on average better off,
or receive a greater net sum of benefits, we can say, for short, that there
would be more [well-being]...If we cared only about equality, we would
be Pure Egalitarians. If we cared only about [well-being], we would be
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Pure Utilitarians - or what is normally called Utilitarians. But most of
us accept a pluralist view: one that appeals to more than one principle
or value” (p. 4).
When comparing (1) and (2) in Parfit’s example, it would be sufficient to appeal
to the weak principle of personal good. But Parfit defends (1) by appealing to the
weak principle of well-being. That is unfortunate, because there is a fundamental
difference between these two principles. In my view, egalitarians ought to accept that
the weak principle of personal good provides a more fundamental expression of moral
equality than the weak principle of equality. But I cannot see that egalitarians in
general should accept that the weak principle of well-being expresses moral equality
in a way that is on par with expressing moral equality by an equal distribution.
Actually, many egalitarians seem to reject utilitarian reasoning altogether, and on
this basis they might think that they should reject a pluralistic egalitarian theory
as well. This is suggested by McKerlie (1994).27
“And those egalitarians who believe that there is something funda-
mentally wrong with the kind of thinking done by the utilitarian principle
would not be willing to include it (or any other principle formally like
it) in the combined view.” (p. 27).
However, as I have shown, egalitarians do not have to include utilitarian reason-
ing in order to have a workable theory. It is sufficient that they accept the weak
principle of personal good.
This is not to say that the weak principle of well-being cannot be derived from an
idea of moral equality among people. It can, as illustrated by Kymlicka (1988). And
it is possible that some egalitarians want to combine these two ways of expressing
moral equality in an all things considered evaluation (see for example Nagel, 1979,
p. 122).28 Moreover, other egalitarians may want to include utilitarian reasoning
even though they reject it as an expression of moral equality. For these people, the
appropriate expression of moral equality is not the only value of importance.
27See also McKerlie (1994, footnote 5).
28On the other hand, Nagel (1991, p. 78) rejects the idea that utilitarianism represents a rea-
sonable expression of the moral equality of people. Be that as it may. Our concern is to see how
these two approaches can be combined, if people find such a framework attractive.
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Let weak moderate egalitarianism be the name of the set of positions that com-
bine the weak principle of well-being and the weak principle of equality. This frame-
work allows for a number of specific approaches, though the nature of these ap-
proaches depends on our interpretation of the previous characterisation of the lex-
imin principle. If we endorse my favorite interpretation and acknowledge that the
leximin principle always promotes equality (in cases of conflict), then a weak moder-
ate egalitarian would simply be someone who weighed the utilitarian and the leximin
argument. There would be no reason to allow for other relative weighting schemes,
because in this case we think that the leximin principle captures all there is to say
about equality promotion. On the other hand, if we think that the leximin principle
is an imperfect framework for equality promotion, then we might consider alterna-
tive approaches (as the rank order approach) tenable when aiming at combining
equality promotion with utilitarian reasoning.
Usually, the economists have taken the Pigou-Dalton criterion of transfer as the
point of departure for a discussion of this framework.29
The Pigou-Dalton Principle of Transfer: If there is a transfer of a fixed amount
of well-being from a better off person to a worse off person (without any reversal of
the relative positions), then the new alternative is better.
Many economists consider this condition the defining feature of egalitarianism
(see for example Lambert, 1993, p. 57). The claim is that the condition captures a
set of cases where it should be uncontroversial to give the upper hand to the weak
principle of equality. The total amount of well-being is unchanged, and hence there
is no counterargument to equality promotion. Of course, the premise for all this is
that equality decreases in these cases, which by economists have been considered
uncontroversial.
“The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is egalitarian, in the sense that
any transfer from a poorer to a richer person must be seen as an increase
in inequality and regarded as a worsening” (Sen and Foster (1997, p.
145)).
29Often, and originally, this condition is stated in the space of income (see Dalton, 1920, p. 352),
but for our purpose it is appropriate to express it in the space of well-being. See Sen and Foster
(1997) for further discussion and definitions.
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In contrast, Temkin (1993) urges the need for a revision of the Pigou-Dalton
principle in order to make it part of an egalitarian framework, and moreover claims
that “[m]ost economists seem to have been unaware of PD’s serious limitations” (p.
84). What does Temkin have in mind?
Temkin’s criticism seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the work of
economists. The two cases that really worry Temkin are cases where we have a
reversal of the relative positions of the two persons affected by the transfer (p. 82)
and cases where the total amount of well-being is affected by the transfer (pp. 77-82).
But none of these cases are covered by the Pigou-Dalton criterion, as should be clear
by the presentation in Dalton (1920, p. 351). This is well-known among economists,
even though we often informally present this condition in a rather sloppy manner.
A case in point is the above quote from Sen and Foster (1997), which might cause
some confusion. Temkin (op.cit., p. 77) and other philosophers use the word transfer
somewhat differently from the economist. An economist think of a transfer situation
as a case where the total amount of well-being (or income) is the same, whereas
philosophers work with both efficient and inefficient transfers that cover cases where
the total amount of well-being differ. As a consequence, Temkin interprets the Pigou-
Dalton criterion as saying in general that if the well-being of the worse-off increases
and the better off decreases then there is equality promotion (see op.cit., pp. 82-83).
But that is not the Pigou-Dalton principle, but the Hammond Equity condition
introduced earlier.
However, Temkin’s analysis adds insight to the controversial aspect of the Pigou-
Dalton condition. The problem with the Pigou-Dalton principle is that it only focuses
on the narrowing of the gap between the persons involved in the transfer, which
implies that it satisfies the claim of separability. No one can reject that such a transfer
reduces the inequality between these two. But at the same time it may increase the
gap between others in society. Hence, if we care about promoting overall equality
in the distribution and not only equality between the two persons involved in the
conflict, then we may question the condition. Consider the following case, where we
evaluate x = (1, 50, 100) and y = (1, 75, 75). Surely, there is complete equality among
the two better off in y. But at the same time the transfer has caused an increase in
inequality between the worst off and the second worst off. When evaluating overall
equality, are we sure that this increase in equality is outweighed by the decrease
in equality among the two better off? Of course, one way of defending the Pigou-
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Dalton condition is to say that the increase in inequality between the two worse off is
actually outweighed by the decrease in inequality between the worst off and the best
off. As is easily seen, the reduction in distance between the best off and the worst
off is equal to the increase in distance between the worst off and the second worst
off. This is no coincidence, it is a generic feature of the kind of transfers captured
by the Pigou-Dalton condition. But it is not obvious to me how we should evaluate
these two effects when we look at overall inequality. It might be the case that our
main concern from this perspective is the isolation of the worst off at the bottom of
the distribution in y. If so, then we may question the Pigou-Dalton condition. And
I don’t find such a view entirely implausible, even though my own view is more in
line with the perspective of Nagel discussed earlier.
Even if we accept the Pigou-Dalton principle as a prerequisite for any egalitar-
ian framework, as we will do in the rest of the paper, we should notice that this
condition allows for a very broad interpretation of the egalitarian framework. There
are positions within this framework that do not pay very much attention to equal-
ity promotion. The most extreme case would be what I will name quasi-egalitarian
utilitarianism, which only assigns weight to equality considerations when the to-
tal amount of well-being is the same in society. In all other cases, it follows the
utilitarian approach. This approach satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle, but for all
practical purposes it is a utilitarian approach. Of course, if we demand continuity in
the all things considered evaluation, then we exclude this approach and the leximin
principle (which is the other extreme of moderate egalitarianism). Hence, in general,
we can portray the four main categories of egalitarianism as follows.
Kind of egalitarianism Important properties
Strong Egalitarianism Violates the general principle of personal good
Strict Moderate Egalitarianism Discontinuous, absolute priority to equality
Weak Moderate Egalitarianism Continuous, trade-off between well-being and equality
Quasi-Egalitarian Utilitarianism Discontinuous, absolute priority to well-being
Table 1 - Egalitarian positions
How do we move from this overall framework of egalitarianism to a conclusion
in a particular case if we do not assign absolute priority to equality promotion
or utilitarian reasoning? One possibility is to work with a single weak moderate
egalitarian position, but the more prominent view within economics has been to look
for the possibility of establishing results that are valid for a broad range of moderate
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egalitarian positions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this literature
(see Sen and Foster, 1997). But I should like to end this section by providing some
comments on Temkin’s (1993) criticism of this approach.30
“The preceding considerations suggest a general and deep problem
facing the intersection approach. The problem...is that often an intersec-
tion approach will fail to yield an ordering when an ordering should be
yielded, and this may be so even in cases where it is quite clear what
the correct ordering is...The problem with the intersections is they don’t
allow trade-offs...It is no doubt true that sometimes when different facets
of a multifaceted notion point in different directions a ranking cannot be
expected to emerge. But it by no means follows that whenever different
facets of a multifaceted notion point in different directions a meaningful
ranking cannot emerge...Central to the approach I have been advocat-
ing is that it will involve precisely the sort of trade-offs precluded by
the intersection approach. Thus, before rendering a final judgment as to
how two alternatives compare, such an approach will take into account
the number and relative significance of the aspects supporting possible
judgments as well as the degree to which the different aspects support
those judgments” (pp. 144-150).
Again, I believe Temkin’s criticism mainly to be based on a misunderstanding
of the work of economists. Actually, this possibility is considered by Temkin himself
(op.cit., p. 146), but rejected. Still I think that this is the case. Let us illustrate
the disagreement in the context of an all things considered evaluation within the
framework of weak moderate egalitarianism. The weak principle of equality and
the weak principle of well-being often points in different directions. But sometimes
they are reconciled, and we usually think that this is in the cases covered by the
Pigou-Dalton principle. The intersection approach applied on the weak principle
of equality and the weak principle of well-being then tells us that we can make a
robust conclusion in these cases. However, Temkin insists that we should move on,
and that it by no means follows that whenever these two principles are in conflict a
30Temkin (1993) discusses the intersection approach in the context of inequality measurement,
but his arguments seem to apply more generally. In any case, my comments are equally relevant
for inequality evaluations as for all things considered evaluations.
31
meaningful all things considered evaluation cannot emerge. I totally agree on that.
By way of illustration, assume that we want to establish an all things considered
evaluation on the basis of the values held by some people in a society. If these people
support a more narrow range of appropriate weighting schemes, then we can reach
a conclusion in cases not covered by the Pigou-Dalton condition.
But is this in conflict with the idea of the intersection approach? No. “Intersection
quasi-orderings are based on unanimity according to a given set of criteria” (Sen
and Foster, 1997, p. 132). Hence, if we agree on how to make trade-offs between
different aspects of a situation, then the intersection approach tells us to extend
the incomplete ranking to these cases as well. Thus, the framework advocated by
Temkin (1993) is already part of the intersection approach applied by economists,
and this framework does not face a general and deep problem. However, it should
be applied with care, because sometimes we might include in the analysis positions
that do not have (or demand) any support and hence end up with a too incomplete
ranking. But that is a different story.31
5 Prioritarianism and Sufficiency
Consider again the case where there is a conflict between the best off and the worst
off in society. In order to promote equality, we have to assign absolute priority to the
worst off in all these cases. And the reason for this is that the other person involved
in the conflict is the best off. Hence, it is independent of whether the best off lives
in extreme destitution or has a very good life. But I assume that most people think
otherwise. I believe most people find it much harder to assign absolute priority to
the worst off if both live in destitution. In other words, most of us take into account
the absolute circumstances of people when evaluating the extent of priority to assign
to the worse off in a distributive conflict.
Roughly speaking, this is the message of prioritarians. And it is an important
one. It highlights the fact that there are different reasons for caring about the worse
off in society. Still, the fact that the absolute circumstances of people affect our
evaluations is not news to economists or philosophers, and hence we may wonder why
prioritarianism has been considered with so much interest in recent philosophical
31I have explored this issue in relation to poverty measurement in Tungodden (2001).
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debate. In order to answer this question, it will be useful to have a brief look at
how prioritarianism has been introduced among philosophers. The most prominent
contribution on prioritarianism is Parfit (1995), who defines the approach as follows.
The Priority View: Benefitting people matters more the worse off these people
are.
However, as remarked by Parfit (1995) himself, the definition is imprecise, be-
cause it does not clearly distinguish prioritarianism from egalitarianism.
“But this claim by itself, does not define a different view, since it
would be made by all Egalitarians. If we believe that we should aim for
equality, we shall think it more important to benefit those who are worse
off. Such benefits reduce inequality. If that is why we give such benefits
priority, we do not hold the Priority View. On this view, as I define it
here, we do not believe in equality. We give priority to the worse off, not
because this will reduce inequality, but for other reasons” (p. 22).
Even if you give priority to the worse off, you do not necessarily hold the priority
view according to the definition of Parfit. What matters is why you give priority,
which, of course, should have been reflected in the naming and definition of the posi-
tion. In my view, a more reasonable labelling would be to make a distinction between
relative and absolute prioritarianism. But be that as it may. In order to avoid any
confusion, I will refer to the views that pay attention to absolute circumstances as
prioritarian and continue to use egalitarianism about the views paying attention to
relative circumstances. Moreover, notice that in order to make this principle directly
comparable to the weak principle of equality and the weak principle of well-being,
we should have reformulated it such that it represents a position on what makes
something better in one respect and not as an all things considered relation. How-
ever, usually this principle is considered in isolation, and thus we will not bother to
do that.
Prioritarianism can be defended in a negative and a positive way.32 The positive
approach is to defend prioritarianism on its own, that is to show that it represents an
32When discussing egalitarian reasoning, I made a rough distinction between claims about value
that are linked to the moral equality of people and not. And I argued that the only appropriate
way of representing the egalitarian reason is to view it as a relevant way of expressing the moral
equality of people. This is not the case with prioritarianism. I believe that it makes sense to defend
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important point of view when reasoning about distributive principles. The negative
approach is to defend it by showing that it represents one way of escaping a number of
problems facing standard egalitarian reasoning. Much of the philosophical literature
applies the negative approach. By way of illustration, when Parfit (1995, p. 34)
summarises his discussion on egalitarianism and prioritarianism, he introduces the
priority view as an option that we can move to when we realize the problems facing
the egalitarian approach to distributive justice.
What problems do we then avoid when moving from egalitarianism to prioritar-
ianism? First, Parfit (op.cit., p. 22) suggests that it is an advantage that prioritari-
anism can be considered a complete moral view, in contrast to any plausible version
of egalitarianism that ought to be combined with another principle. This fact is
also pointed at by McKerlie (1994, p. 27):“some egalitarians regret the fact that
the equality view must be combined with another principle. They want a simpler
alternative to utilitarianism, and they object to the intuitive nature of the judg-
ments we must make in weighing the reasons provided by the two principles against
one another”.33 However, this seems odd to me. Prioritarianism is also intuitionist
(Parfit, 1995, p. 20), because it does not tell us how much importance to attach to
differences in absolute circumstances, and hence the only difference in this respect
(between the two positions) is that in one case we have to rely on intuition when
weighing reasons and in the other case when interpreting the single reason consti-
tuting our moral position. And I cannot see that this distinction is of any significant
importance.
Second, Parfit (op.cit., p. 23) stresses that by endorsing the priority view we
avoid the levelling down objection. Certainly, on the basis of a concern for the
absolute circumstances of people, there is nothing to be gained by reducing the level
this view without linking it to the moral equality of the agents in question (see also McKerlie
(1994) and Parfit (1995)). By way of illustration, our concern for the absolute circumstances of
animals might imply that we assign priority to alleviating their sufferings in a conflict with some
of our more trivial interests. If so, then this does not reflect any position on the moral equality
between people and animals, but simply a particular concern for the alleviation of suffering among
all morally relevant agents.
But prioritarianism can be defended as the best expression of moral equality among people, and
(among others) Nagel (1979, 1991) has suggested this view.
33Of course, this is only the case of weak moderate egalitarianism. See also Rawls (1971, pp.
34-40).
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of well-being of the better off. But we have already argued against the levelling down
objection, and hence this negative reason should be rejected as well.
Finally, many egalitarians have been reluctant to including utilitarian reasoning
in their view on distributive justice. This is not necessary, as illustrated by strict
moderate egalitarianism. However, it seems unavoidable if you want to take into
account gains and losses in a weaker version of moderate egalitarianism (without
including prioritarianism or resorting to an intransitive framework). Many philoso-
phers find this problematic, because they reject assigning value to the total amount
of well-being in a situation or value to the expression of moral equality by assigning
equal weight to each person’s gains and losses, and thus they reject including these
reasons in a combined distributive view. In this context, they find the prioritarian
reason appealing, because it expresses a different perspective that allows for the
inclusion of a concern for gains and losses and at the same time expresses a con-
cern for the worse off. Eventually, gains and losses are included in the prioritarian
framework if we do not assign infinitely more importance to improving the absolute
circumstances of poorer people than better off people.
Is this distinction really relevant? I think so, and I believe that the clarification
of this aspect is an interesting contribution of the recent philosophical debate on
prioritarianism. Economists have for a long time recognised a formal difference be-
tween social welfare functions assigning priority on the basis of relative positions and
not; see for example Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, pp. 340-343). But still I will argue
that we have not explored in any detail the basis for this distinction and possible
implications of this difference in the mode of justification. Again as an illustration,
we could notice that Atkinson and Stiglitz only present prioritarian approach as a
formal possibility, without explaining what kind of intuition this framework cap-
tures.34 Our main aim has been to “bring in a built-in bias towards equality” (Sen
and Foster, 1997, p. 20) in the all things considered evaluation, and in this work we
have tended to think about the prioritarian and egalitarian perspective as two possi-
ble representations of a concern for equality. The recent philosophical debate makes
clear that there is more to this story. Egalitarianism is about improving the rela-
tive circumstances of people and hence value equality directly, whereas the essence
of prioritarianism is to improve the absolute circumstances which is only indirectly
34Weirich (1983) is an early philosophical discussion of formal rules capturing the prioritarian
intuition.
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related to a concern about equality.
I assume that the intuition of many economists working with prioritarian social
welfare functions has been similar to the one of prioritarian philosophers, but we
have been content with the formal presentation. However, as stressed by Rawls
(1974, p. 644-645) in his reply to Alexander (1974), there is a need for going beyond
the formal framework and work out in more detail the underlying moral outlook.
And that is what the prioritarian philosophers have been doing. In other words, the
main contribution is not the introduction of a completely new idea (that absolute
circumstances should count in distributive reasoning has been suggested by many),
but the clarification of how this idea constitutes a distinctive and general perspective
on distributive reasoning.35
Having said this, I should add that the economists have recognised that some
important prioritarian positions cannot be justified on purely egalitarian grounds,
even in combination with utilitarian reasoning. The cases I have in mind are those
that include an absolute poverty line in our distributive judgments. And I think
that the possibility of including an absolute poverty line represents one of the most
important positive reasons for the prioritarian perspective. Most of us recognise the
special importance of improving the lives of poor people, and hence should like to
include this as a special reason for assigning priority to the worse off in a distributive
conflict. The hunger of the hungry, the need of the needy, and the suffering of the
ill (Raz,1986, p. 240) provide separate reasons for assigning priority to the worse off
that cannot be explained within a framework combining egalitarian and utilitarian
reasoning.
It has been argued by some philosophers that an absolute threshold is all there
should be to prioritarianism. In particular, Frankfurt (1987, p. 22) suggests the doc-
trine of sufficiency :36 “If everyone had enough, it would be of no moral consequence
whether some had more than others” (p. 21). Hence, according to Frankfurt, we
should assign priority to those below this sufficiency threshold in a conflict with
35Similarly, we may say the same about Sen’s capability approach (see Sen (1985)). Over the
years, many people have argued for like views, but they have not clearly shown of such an argument
could constitute a distinct perspective on our understanding of the notion of well-being and how
it relates to other views. And that I believe was the main contribution - and an important one -
of Sen’s work.
36For a critical discussion of Frankfurt’s argument, see Goodin (1987).
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people who have enough, but there is no reason to assign priority to the worse off
among people who have enough.37
Such an approach faces at least two challenges. First, it needs to explain what
it means that someone has enough.38 Second, we need to know why we should only
assign priority to those below the sufficiency threshold.
“In the doctrine of sufficiency the use of the notion ‘enough’ pertains
to meeting a standard rather than to reaching a limit. To say that a per-
son has enough money means that he is content, or that it is reasonable
for him to be content, with having no more money than he has. And to
say this is, in turn, to say something like the following: the person does
not (or cannot reasonably) regard whatever (if anything) is unsatisfying
or distressing about his life as due to having too little money. In other
words, if a person is (or ought reasonably to be) content with the amount
of money he has, then insofar as he is or has a reason to be unhappy with
the way his life is going, he does not (or cannot reasonably) suppose that
money would - either as a sufficient or as a necessary condition - enable
him to become (or have reason to be) significantly less unhappy with it.
It is essential to understand that having enough money differs from
37Related views have been expressed by (among others) Anderson (1999) and Hausman (2001).
Anderson argues that “democratic equality guarantees not effective access to equal levels of func-
tioning but effective access to levels of functioning, sufficient to stand as an equal in society” (p.
318), and in a similar vein Hausman claims that “[a] concern with equality of moral status supports
a limited prioritarianism...not... complete equalizing” (p. 6). Among these writers, there seems to
be the view that to appeal to complete equality causes a distraction in moral action and reasoning
(see also Rosenberg, 1995), which is most explicitly expressed by Frankfurt (1989). “In this way the
doctrine of equality contributes to the moral disorientation and shallowness of our time” (p. 23).
There are many possible interpretations of such a claim, but in any case this cannot be launched as
an argument against unlimited prioritarianism! Equality is not the aim of this approach, and thus
the criticism seems often misplaced. Moreover, notice that to say that it is of particular importance
to guarantee everyone a certain level of well-being is something different from saying that this is
all that matters, an issue I return to below.
38Rosenberg (1995) argues that “[o]perationalizing sufficiency is probably far easier than estab-
lishing equal shares” (p. 66). Surely, it is hard to operationalize the ideal of equality, but in order
to compare this task with the doctrine of sufficiency we have to determine what it means that
someone has enough. Hence, a priori it is hard to say whether the need for a practical standard
counts in favour of a doctrine of sufficiency or not.
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merely having enough to get along or enough to make life marginally
tolerable. People are not generally content with living on the brink. The
point of the doctrine of sufficiency is not that the only morally important
distributional consideration with respect to money is whether people
have enough to avoid economic misery. A person who might naturally
and appropriately be said to have just barely enough does not, by the
standard invoked in the doctrine of sufficiency, have enough at all” (pp.
37-38).
One problem with this definition is that it is stated in the space of income. But
that should not distract us too much. For the sake of simplicity (and nothing else!),
let us assume that people are equal in all other respects. Then we can read Frankfurt
as saying that there exists a level of well-being that makes us content or ought to
make us content, even though we could raise our level of well-being even further by
an increase in income. I am not sure how to understand this proposal, but in my
view there are two possibilities. One is to argue that there is this feeling of content
(or absence of distress) which can be satisfied with a certain amount of money, and
which we can argue should be included as a need in an expanded version of the idea
of an absolute poverty line. Hunger, illness, social exclusion, and so on cause distress,
but this feeling might also be present when the most basic needs are fulfilled. And
we might suggest that at a certain level of well-being, this feeling disappear.39 The
other interpretation, relying on Frankfurt’s claim that reasonable people ought to
feel content at a certain level of well-being, is moral, and is that there is no reason
(from your point of view) to object to unequal distributions of well-being as long as
you have enough. In other words, that enough defines the level of well-being above
which there is no reason to complain.
“But a reasonable person might well regard an unequal distribution
as entirely acceptable even though he did not presume that any other
distribution would benefit him less. For he might believe that the unequal
distribution provided him with quite enough, and he might reasonably
39The inclusion of the feeling of content in the definition of an absolute threshold may cause a
relative threshold in the space of income (as pointed out more generally in Sen (1983)). See also
Rosenberg (1995), who defends the doctrine of sufficiency on the basis of an idea about what is
the “real interests” (p. 67) of a person.
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be unequivocally content with that, with no concern for the possibility
that some other arrangement would provide him with more” (op.cit, p.
36).
Hence, Frankfurt suggests that if we seek the ideal of acceptability suggested by
Nagel, then there is no reason to object to a distribution as long as everyone has
enough. Nagel (1991, p. 81) clearly rejects this possibility, and admittedly I find it
hard to follow the moral intuition of Frankfurt on this issue. Crisp (2000) suggests
an alternative defence, where our priority to the worse off is based on compassion.
And Crisp argues as Frankfurt that this only implies priority to people below a
certain absolute threshold of sufficiency, because above this threshold compassion
actually gives out (p. 19). But is it really so?40 In my view, a more plausible reading
of an absolute threshold is that it represents a level of well-being where there is
a fundamental change in moral significance, even though we still care about the
distributive problem among people above this level. Of course, it is not easy to draw
any such line, and in that respect it is important to notice the work of economists on
fuzzy poverty lines.41 But I believe that most people share the intuition that there
is a fundamental difference in the complaints of a person living in destitution and
the complaints of a person living a good life. We may say that this illustrates a case
where the better off person has a enough (in order to fulfill all important needs),
and hence where we assign absolute priority to the poor person (without rejecting
the relevance of the claim of the better off person). Or in the language of Crisp,
we may argue that our compassion for the poor person is given absolute priority,
without rejecting that we assign compassion to the improvements in the life of the
better off person as well.
40When discussing the sufficiency doctrine of Anderson (1999), Arneson (2000) explicitly rejects
such a view on distributive justice.
“Democratic equality holds that once someone is above the basic capability threshold, justice
is unconcerned with whether or not his life goes better or worse. Why not? Suppose that society
faces an issue, say a choice of tax policy, where the interests of those who are far above the basic
capability threshold...are starkly opposed to the interests of those who are just above the thresh-
old...Unfortunately someone’s ox must be gored. Whose? Responsibility-catering prioritarianism
says that on the facts as described, other things equal we should favor the worse off in order to
fulfill the requirements of justice. Democratic equality says that the issue is a “don’t care” from
the standpoint of justice. I disagree” (p. 347).
41Again, see Sen and Foster (1997, p. 188-191) for an overview.
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In sum, I believe that the notion of an absolute threshold is of fundamental
importance, and that it represents the most important reason for including the
prioritarian point of view within any reasonable moral conception of the distributive
problem. Of course, it is hard to determine how much more importance to assign
to the needs of a poor person in a conflict with a person above the threshold.
But I think that this particular aspect of prioritarianism is fairly well-recognised by
economists, and that the more fundamental lesson learned by the recent contribution
of prioritarian philosophers is that our concern for the absolute circumstances of
people can be expanded to a more general moral theory, as suggested by among
others Nagel (1991).
“One might of course agree that the world is a pretty terrible place
without subscribing to [a prioritarianism] as general as I have proposed.
One might say that all the moral intuition of which we can be confident
would be fully accounted for by a principle of priority to those who are
not only worse off than others, but absolutely deprived, because their
basic needs for food, shelter, health, and minimal self-respect are not met.
This is certainly a possible view...However, I want to defend the stronger
priority of worse over better off, for two reasons. First, it seems intuitively
right...I do not think that our sense of priority for improvements in the
position of those lower down on the scale is exhausted by the case of
the absolutely needy...My second reason...is that it is supported by the
best theoretical interpretation of impartiality, in terms of individualized
concern. The resulting method of pairwise comparison with priority going
to the lower member of the pair simply does not cease to apply above
the level of basic needs” (pp. 69-70).
On the basis of the discussion so far, we may sketch (very roughly) the following
general structure of prioritarianism.
Kind of prioritarianism Important properties
Strict Prioritarianism The leximin principle
Restricted Moderate Prioritarianism Priority, trade-off restricted by threshold
Unrestricted Moderate Prioritarianism Priority, trade-off in general
Quasi-Prioritarian Utilitarianism Equal to quasi-egalitarian utilitarianism
Table 2 - Prioritarian positions
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All these prioritarian rules satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle, which is unques-
tionable within this framework. This is due to the fact that any prioritarian rule
must be separable. The level of well-being of indifferent people is of no importance
when we assign priority on the basis of the absolute circumstances of people, and
the separability part was the controversial issue when we discussed the Pigou-Dalton
principle in the context of equality promotion. However, the prioritarian rules differ
in two respects, and that is in the importance they attach to the absolute threshold
and in the extent of the priority they assign to the worse off in general.
How does this structure compare to the egalitarian framework presented in Table
1? First, we should notice that there is no prioritarian position equivalent to strong
egalitarianism, which is due to the fact that all prioritarian rules satisfy the general
principle of personal good. Second, strict prioritarianism, i.e. absolute priority to
improving the absolute circumstances of the worse off, is by definition the leximin
principle, whereas it is somewhat more controversial to claim that strict egalitarian-
ism, i.e. absolute priority to equality promotion, can be captured by this principle
(though I have suggested that we should think so). Finally, prioritarianism includes
two intermediate classes, which reflects the presence of an absolute threshold in
prioritarian reasoning.
It is clear that if we want to include an absolute threshold in our reasoning,
then we have to rely on prioritarian reasoning. But are there other cases where it
matters whether we apply the egalitarian or the prioritarian framework? There are
two ways of approaching this question. One is to look for cases where it is implausible
that (some rule) within both positions support the same conclusion; the other is to
look for cases where it is impossible that (some rule) within both positions support
the same conclusion. Economists have been eager to look for the impossible cases
(Broome, 2001, Fleurbaey, 2001); philosophers have been more concerned with the
implausible cases (McKerlie, 1994, Parfit, 1995).
Let us first look at the impossible cases. As far as I can see, the only cases where
it will be impossible to attain the same conclusion on the basis of both perspectives
are cases where the all things considered evaluation is non-separable. By way of
illustration, compare x = (1, 4, 4), y = (1, 3, 6), z = (4, 4, 10), and w = (3, 6, 10).
In this case, it is possible to find a weak moderate egalitarian position saying that
x is better than y and w is better than z. But no prioritarian rule can support
this conclusion, because in order to do that we need to assign importance to the
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well-being level of indifferent people in our evaluation. And that cannot be justified
within a prioritarian framework. However, the converse conclusion cannot be drawn,
as we elaborated on in section 4, because a separable all things considered evaluation
can also be based on a moderate egalitarian rule.
What about the implausible cases? In the philosophical literature, there has
been some discussion about the strength of the leximin argument if derived from
prioritarian reasoning and not from some version of egalitarianism. The intuition of
philosophers like Parfit (1995) and McKerlie (1994) is that the leximin principle is
quite implausible as some version of the priority view.
“If we are not concerned with relative levels, why should the smallest
benefit to the ...worst-off person count for infinitely more than much
greater benefits to other representative people?” (Parfit, 1995, p. 39).
“If the difference principle is a version of the priority view, it is more
vulnerable to the intuitive objection. The objection seems to show that,
although we might give greater priority to helping the very worst-off, we
do not give it absolute priority. We think that a small gain for them can
be morally outweighed by a much larger gain for others who are also
badly-off” (McKerlie, 1994, p. 33).
It is clear that within the egalitarian framework, we can derive the leximin prin-
ciple from a set of first principles and thereby avoid intuitionism (Rawls, 1971, p.
34), whereas a prioritarian defence of the leximin principle has to be based on intu-
itive reasoning. That is an important difference, of course, and it might be the case
that our intuitions undermine the prioritarian justification of the leximin principle.
In any case, I believe that the discussion of the implausible cases points at the
most fundamental issue in distributive reasoning, to wit how much priority to assign
to the worse off. It is on this issue we find strong practical political disagreement,
and not on the question about whether we should adopt a separable or non-separable
perspective. This is not to say that it is unimportant to clarify the different possible
modes of justification. But I think that this exercise is of particular importance if it
can guide us on the essential question about the extent of priority to assign to the
worse off.
Economists prefer the intersection approach, and the Pigou-Dalton condition
represents the basis for an intersection approach that includes both the moderate
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egalitarian and the prioritarian perspective. This is of course a very conservative
framework that pays attention to all possible positions. And maybe we have been
too anxious to move beyond this framework and use intuitive reasoning in order to
arrive at a narrower set of plausible positions? If so, then it might be the case that
the distinction between moderate egalitarianism and prioritarianism is important
because it provides us with different intuitions about the extent of priority to assign
to the worse off. It might be the case that egalitarian intuitions support much more
priority to the worse off than prioritarian intuition. I am not sure. But I believe this
to be a possibility worthy of reflection.
6 Non-aggregative Reasoning
So far we have suggested that the leximin principle can be defended on the basis of
equality promotion or as an intuition about the extent of priority to assign to the
worse off within prioritarianism. In this section, I will look at a third way of defending
this principle, by taking as the point of departure that we want to avoid aggregative
reasoning. I find the non-aggregative perspective particularly interesting, because it
highlights the fact that aggregation is an issue that should be treated independently
of the question about how much priority to assign to the worse off. It is easy to
overlook this fact, and therefore reject non-aggregation on the wrong premises. The
non-aggregative claim is that the numbers should not count (Taurek, 1978), and not
that we should assign absolute priority to the worse off. Maybe some readers find
non-aggregation equally implausible as assigning absolute priority to the worse off.
But as we will see, there are interesting arguments supporting a non-aggregative
approach, and thus we should not reject this perspective out of hand. Hence, in
this section I will look at both the grounds of justification and implications of the
non-aggregative perspective.
One of the earliest expressions of the non-aggregative perspective was Taurek
(1978).
“My way of thinking about these trade-off situations consists, essen-
tially, in seriously considering what will be lost or suffered by this one
person if I do not prevent it, and in comparing the significance of that
for him with what would be lost or suffered by anyone else if I do not
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prevent it. This reflects a refusal to take seriously in these situation any
notion of the sum of two persons’ separate losses...The discomfort of each
of a large number of individuals experiencing a minor headache does not
add up to anyone’s experiencing a migraine. In such a trade-off situation
as this we are to compare your pain or your loss, not to our collective or
total pain, whatever exactly that is supposed to be, but to what would
be suffered or lost by any given single of us” (pp. 307-308).
Nagel (1979) derives the non-aggregative perspective from the idea that we
should seek to establish unanimity about distributive principles on the basis of
individual acceptability.
“The main point about a measure of urgency is that it is done by pair-
wise comparison of the situations of individuals. The simplest method
would be to count any improvement in the situation of someone worse
off as more urgent than any improvement in the situation of someone
better off; but this is not especially plausible. It is more reasonable to
accord greater urgency to larger improvements somewhat higher in the
scale than to very small improvements lower down. Such a modified prin-
ciple could still be described as selecting the alternative that was least
unacceptable from each point of view. This method can be extended to
problems of social choice involving large numbers of people. So long as
numbers do not count it remains a type of unanimity criterion, defined
by a suitable measure of urgency” (p. 125).42
This view is also closely related to the kind of contractualism defended by Scan-
lon (1982, 1998).43 Scanlon (1998) looks for principles that no one, if suitably mo-
tivated, could reasonably reject, and where “the justifiability of a moral principle
42See also Nagel (1970, pp. 140-142) and Nagel (1979). Nagel acknowledges that it is hard to see
that the numbers should not count at all when reasoning on distributive conflicts, but he claims
that if we accept some kind of aggregation procedure then we cannot endorse this by any appeal
to unanimity ((1979, p. 125) and (1991, p. 73)). See Brink (1993, p. 280) for a rejection of the link
between reasonable unanimity and pairwise-comparisons.
43But with important differences. First, Scanlon is in general sceptical to the welfaristic frame-
work; second Scanlon provides an alternative justification of the need for unanimity; and third the
focus of Scanlon is more on personal morality than the ethics of distribution in general (see also
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depends only on various individuals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and al-
ternatives to it. This feature is central to the guiding idea of contractualism, and is
also what enables it to provide a clear alternative to utilitarianism and other forms
of consequentialism...utilitarianism, and most other forms of consequentialism, have
highly implausible implications, which flow directly from the fact that their mode of
justification is, at base, an aggregative one...”(pp. 229-230). However, also Scanlon
rejects that the only individual reason of relevance should be the level of well-being
a person attains in different alternatives.
“Under contractualism, when we consider a principle our attention
is naturally directed first to those who would do worst under it. This is
because if anyone has reasonable grounds for objecting to the principle
it is likely to be them. It does not follow, however, that contractualism
always requires us to select the principle under which the expectations of
the worse off are highest. The reasonableness of the Losers’ objection to
A is not established simply by the fact that they are worse off under A
and no-one would be this badly off under E. The force of their complaint
depends also on the fact that their position under A is, in absolute terms,
very bad, and would be significantly better under E. This complaint must
be weighed against those of individuals who would do worse under E.
The question to be asked is, is it unreasonable for someone to refuse
to put up with the Loser’s situation under A in order that someone else
should be able to enjoy the benefits which he would have to give up under
E? As the supposed situation of the Loser under A becomes better, or
his gain under E smaller in relation to sacrifices required to produce it,
his case is weakened” (Scanlon (1982, p. 123)).
Hence, roughly speaking, we may say that the general perspective of Nagel and
Scanlon consists of two main arguments. First, that the non-aggregative approach is
the most legitimate distributive perspective, because it comes closest to our demand
for unanimity among reasonable people. It supports the alternative that is least
unacceptable to the person to whom it is most unacceptable. Second, that a measure
Nagel, 1999). Moreover, the contractarian perspective of Scanlon (1982) differs somewhat from
the view in Scanlon (1998); see Reibetanz (1998). I will not make any attempt to see how our
discussion relates to the particularities of each of these different non-aggregative positions.
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of individual acceptability should take into account both the level of well-being and
the gains or losses for a person.
But is there any coherent non-aggregative rule that can include this view on
individual acceptability? Again, we will consider the question within a framework
where we accept transitivity.
Let us start by stating the non-aggregative condition somewhat more precisely.
Non-Aggregation: For any two alternatives x and y, if there exists a person j such
that x is more unacceptable to j then y is to any other person, then y is better than
x.44
What remains to be done is to clarify how to determine the degree of unac-
ceptability, where our aim should be to present a view that can be justified both
on egalitarian and prioritarian grounds. But a solution is at hand, to wit a simple
reformulation of the Pigou-Dalton condition.
The Pigou-Dalton Principle of Unacceptability: For any two alternatives x and
y and two persons i and j, if the well-being loss of i is equal to (or greater than) the
well-being gain of j when moving from x to y and i is worse off than j in both x and
y, then y is more unacceptable to i than x to j.
Notice that the egalitarian interpretation of the Pigou-Dalton principle of un-
acceptability is not that it covers cases where equality in the overall distribution
is promoted. It is only that equality would be promoted between the two persons
involved in the pairwise comparison of acceptability.45
However, within this framework, there is no other option than the leximin prin-
ciple.
Observation: The leximin principle is the only transitive rule that satisfies Non-
Aggregation and the Pigou-Dalton principle of Unacceptability.
We have not stated this observation formally, and thus we will only provide
an informal discussion of the structure of the proof. Assume that the observation
44See also Brink (1993), Glannon (1995, p. 447), and Reibetanz (1998, p. 300).
45This is related to our discussion in Section 4 about how to defend separability within an
egalitarian framework, but with two important differences. In that case, we focussed on equality
promotion in general (and not only in the set of cases covered by the Pigou-Dalton principle), and
more importantly we defended an aggregative view that involved equality promotion within the
group of people involved in the conflict.
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is wrong. In that case, there should exist two alternatives x and y such that x is
considered better than y by a rule satisfying the conditions of the observation and
at the same time the worst off i (who is not indifferent) is better off in y than x. I
will take as a point of departure a two person society, but the modification of the
proof for the many person case is trivial. Hence, let us say that x = (10, 100) and
y = (25, 50). Now consider two other alternatives, z and w, which are equal to x and
y, respectively, except for the fact that there is a number of new people in z and w.
We assume three things about these new people. First, they are indifferent about z
and w. Second, they have a well-being level which is in between the well-being levels
of i and the best off in y. Third, the number of new people can be chosen freely. In our
example, let z = (10, 100, 40, 40, 40, 40) and w = (25, 50, 40, 40, 40, 40). According
to the Pigou-Dalton principle of acceptability, the new people cannot influence our
evaluation, because they find both alternatives equally acceptable. Hence, the rule
must consider z better than w. Let z be the status quo and redistribute, where
each step is a two person conflict between the best off and one of the new persons
in z, until all of them and the best off losses less than the worst off by a move
to w. As an illustration, the first step in our example could be to move from z
to the distribution (10, 90, 50, 40, 40, 40). Each such step is endorsed by the Pigou-
Dalton principle of unacceptability, and hence the new alternative, in our case z∗ =
(10, 60, 50, 50, 50, 50), must be better than w from transitivity. However, according
to the same principle, w is better than z∗, which shows that the supposition in the
first part of this paragraph is not possible.
Hence, if we accept transitivity, then the leximin principle is the only non-
aggregative option that can express a concern for the worse off. Thus, it is not
possible to capture the general suggestion of Scanlon and Nagel within a coherent
framework. As in the case of equality promotion discussed in section 4, there are sev-
eral ways of responding to this result (beyond rejecting transitivity).46 So the result
should be interpreted with care. But in my view it provides a very interesting de-
fence of the leximin principle, namely that this is the only coherent non-aggregative
46We may revise our view on the condition of unacceptability, and in light of this result accept
that levels are all that matters. Or we may accept that this result shows us that the leximin
principle is the best we can do within a coherent framework, but still think that this framework
is imperfect, and that it sometimes violates the best account of unacceptability. Finally, we may
argue in favour of a broader “second-best analysis”, where we allow for the possibility that we
sometimes violate the Pigou-Dalton principle of unacceptability.
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rule that always assigns priority to the worse off.
Our result points at another very important issue, which often is forgotten, and
that is that any aggregative approach sometimes accepts that the interests of the
worse off is outweighed by the interests of better off even though each of the better
off gains less than the worse off. Actually, we could have stated an even stronger
observation (which should be easily seen from the proof), and that is that any
aggregative framework accepts that the interests of the worse off is outweighed by
the interests of the better off even though the gain of each of the better off is
infinitesimal. We may name this the tyranny of aggregation (see also Crisp (2000)
and Temkin (2000b)).
Of course, the tyranny of aggregation is well-known in the context of utilitarian-
ism. But it is important to notice that the same argument can be launched against
any other transitive aggregation rule (independent of how much priority these rules
assign to the worse off). Of course, more people need to gain if the aggregative rule
assigns a strong priority to the worse off, but that is of secondary importance for
our argument. The general problem is that these rules allow the loss of a worse off
to be outweighed by a minimal gain of some number of better off people. And that
is highly questionable, as illustrated in a nice example by Scanlon (1998).47
“Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the transmitter room
of a television station. electrical equipment has fallen on his arm, and
we cannot rescue him without turning off the transmitter for fifteen
minutes. A World Cup match is in progress, watched by many people,
and it will not be over for an hour. Jones’s injury will not get any worse
if we wait, but his hand has been mashed and he is receiving extremely
painful electrical shocks. Should we rescue him now or wait until the
match is over? Does the right thing to do depend on how many people
are watching - whether it is one million or five million or a hundred
million? It seems to me that we should not wait, no matter how many
viewers there are...” (p. 235).
Does this mean that we should adopt the leximin principle? Maybe, but we
should have in mind the well-known tyranny of non-aggregation as well.48
47See Temkin (2000b) for an elaborate discussion of this example.
48In some cases, it seems obvious that the numbers should count, for example when we choose
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“But if the choice is between preventing severe hardship for some who
are very poor and deprived, and less severe but still substantial hardship
for those who are better off but still struggling for subsistence, then it is
very difficult for me to believe that the numbers do not count, and that
urgency goes to the worse off however many more there are of the better
off” (Nagel, 1979, p. 125).
Of course, the tyranny of non-aggregation could be stated much stronger, by
noticing that the leximin principle would demand that any minor improvement in
the hardship of the worst off should outweigh any loss of well-being of any other
between saving three of five persons. Within our framework, these cases are covered by the leximin
principle. But since this particular case has caused some worry among the defenders of the non-
aggregative approach (see for example Reibetanz (1998)), I should like to elaborate somewhat on
this problem in a more general setting. Scanlon (1998) expresses his worry as follows:
“The problem is, however, that contractualism appears to go too far in the oppo-
site direction, disallowing any appeal to aggregative benefits even in cases in which
the right thing to do does seem to depend not only on the impact that various actions
would have on particular individuals but also on the number of individuals who would
be so affected. For example, in a situation in which we must choose between saving
two different groups of people from the same loss or injury, it seems that it would be
wrong, absent some special justification, simply to choose the course of action that
leads to more people’s being killed or injured. This appears to pose a problem for
contractualism, since, assuming that the losses or injuries to all the parties are the
same and their grounds for rejecting a principle depend solely on these losses, the
generic reasons for rejecting a principle permitting us to save the smaller number will,
it seems, be evenly balanced by the generic individual reasons for rejecting a principle
requiring one to save the greater number. It therefore seems that as long as it confines
itself to reasons for rejecting arising from individual standpoints contractualism will
be unable to explain how the number of people affected by an action can ever make
a moral difference” (p. 230).
However, if we apply transitivity, then this does not seem too hard to explain. Let x be the case
where we save five persons x1, x2, .., x5, x∗ the case where we only save x1, x2, x3, and y the
case where we save three other persons y1, y2, y3. It follows straightforwardly from this framework
that we should save more people if it is the same group of people involved in both cases, that is
x should be preferred to x∗. Moreover, we should be indifferent between x∗ and y, and hence it
follows from transitivity that x should be preferred to y. In other words, if we accept transitivity
(as for example Reibetanz (1998, p. 311), then we can defend the relevance of numbers in certain
cases on the basis of individual reasons. See also Sanders (1988), Kamm (1993) and Reibetanz
(1998, footnote 12).
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number of people living in destitution. And that is as questionable as the tyranny
of aggregation.
Is it possible to adopt some intermediate position? The quotes from Nagel and
Scanlon may suggest so. Scanlon illustrates the tyranny of aggregation by looking
at a case where (in our context) we may think of the people who gain as well-off
and the one who is loosing as badly-off in an absolute sense.49 On the other hand,
Nagel illustrates the tyranny of non-aggregation by looking at an example where all
the people involved live in destitution. And I don’t think that this is a coincidence,
because our strongest intuitions about the tyranny of aggregation is when a minor
gain of a large number of people living above an absolute threshold outweighs the
losses of a person living below this threshold. And similarly, the tyranny of non-
aggregation is most plausible when we look at people who have roughly speaking
the same living conditions.
Consequently, one solution might be to allow for aggregation within the group
of people living below the absolute threshold and within the group of people above
the absolute threshold, but reject aggregation between these two groups. Actually,
this is close to the structure of the difference principle suggested by Rawls (1971).
“In any case we are to aggregate to some degree over the expectations
of the worst off...[The persons in the original position] interpret [the
difference principle] from the first as a limited aggregative principle and
assess it as such in comparison with other standards. It is not as if
they agreed to think of the least advantaged as literally the worst off
individual...” (p. 98, my emphasis).
Rawls acknowledges that ”the serious difficulty is how to define the least advan-
taged group” (1971, p. 98), and he makes some suggestions on a relative threshold.
But as I have shown in Tungodden (1999), it is not possible to assign importance
to any relative threshold within a coherent framework. Hence, a limited aggregative
principle would have to be based on absolute threshold, which of course is a major
step away from the standard Rawlsian perspective.
49Of course, this does not imply anything about the general level of well-being of these people, but
only about their level of well-being within the distributive unit of the problem. Moreover, notice
that this is not the framework of Scanlon, who rejects to narrow these cases to the welfaristic
framework. Anyhow, I believe that the example captures the intuition I should like to illustrate.
See Norcross (1997) for a general defence of the tyranny of aggregation.
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7 Reason and Representation
Much of the present discussion has taken place within a framework that might be
contested, and hence in this section I should like to elaborate somewhat on two of
the basic features of my approach. First, I have applied the transitivity assump-
tion (on the all things considered relation) extensively; second, I have implicitly
assumed that the badness of inequality is an input to an egalitarian evaluation of
the overall goodness of distributions. However, both these assumptions have been
questionened. It has been argued that our values sometimes imply a violation of
transitivity (Temkin, 1987, 1996, 1999), and moreover that the badness of inequal-
ity might better be understood as a derivative of a distributive sensitive all things
considered relation (Dalton (1920), Atkinson (1970), Ebert (1987), Sen og Foster
(1997)). Let us consider these claims in some more detail, in order to see how they
affect the present discussion.
Most people consider transitivity a fundamental part of practical reasoning. But
Temkin has argued that there are moral cases which cast doubt on this view. Of
particular relevance for our discussion is the argument in Temkin (1987), where
egalitarian reasoning enters the stage in a discussion of the mere addition paradox of
Parfit (1984).50 The paradox combines intuitions about the value of additional lives
and the value of equality. Parfit thinks that the paradox illustrates that a particular
set of intuitions is irrational, whereas Temkin argues that the lesson should be
that we ought to give up any a priori assumption about transitivity. The argument
consists of two steps. First, Temkin claims that egalitarian reasoning produces an
intransitive relation among the alternatives considered in the paradox. Second, he
argues that this intransitivity will be carried over into the all things considered
relation.
“We have seen that inequality is deeply intransitive...Inequality isn’t
all we care about, nor even, perhaps, what we most care about; but,
for many, it is one important element of our judgments of preferability.
Thus, how situations compare regarding inequality may determine how
they compare regarding preferability if ‘other things are equal,’ or at
50I will not explain the paradox itself in any detail, because the details are not essential for
the present discussion. See Parfit (1984), Broome (1996), and Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson
(1997).
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least ‘equal enough.’ But then, if inequality is deeply intransitive, it
seems likely there are bound to be some situations which are equivalent,
or nearly equivalent, in terms of the other ideals we care about such
that the deep intransitivity of inequality will be carried over into our
judgments of preferability...If an important aspect of a complex notion is
deeply intransitive, the notion itself will be deeply intransitive” (Temkin,
1987, p. 153).
The second step of Temkin’s argument looks ingenuous, but the existence part
of his claim is in my view far from trivial. However, I will not dwell on this part, but
in the present context rather look at Temkin’s claim about egalitarian reasoning.
Is it really the case that egalitarian reasoning contributes to produce intransitivity
among the distributions in the paradox?
As an illustration of the structure of the mere addition paradox, consider x = (5),
y = (4, 4, 4), and z = (5, 2, 2), where each position refers to the well-being of a
particular individual. Hence, person two and three in y and z are non-existent in
x. The egalitarian perspective discussed by Temkin (1987, p. 147 and Parfit (1984))
says that with respect to the badness of inequality, x is equal to y, y is better
than z, and z is not worse than x, which points in the direction of an intransitive
relation.51 Obviously, the controversial part of this perspective is the claim that
when comparing x and z, the inequality in z does not matter. How can that be
defended? The argument of Temkin is as follows.
“While inequality is normally a bad feature, it does not make an
outcome worse if it involves the mere addition of extra people who have
lives worth living” (Temkin, 1987, p. 143).
Is it so? Before we answer the question, let me elaborate somewhat on the in-
tuition of Temkin and Parfit. They do not reject that the inequality in z is a bad
feature of this distribution. What they reject is that this bad feature constitutes
an argument in favour of x when compared with z. This is a highly controversial
distinction, though, and we may find it more appropriate to accept that z is worse
51However, it does not imply acyclicality, and hence it might still be possible to find maximal
alternatives in this situation. I will not elaborate on alternative consistency requirements and the
distinction between choice and evaluation; see Sen (1970, 1986, 1995).
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with respect to inequality but still not worse all things considered. According to
Temkin (1987, footnote 7, p. 142), however, such a view faces another problem,
namely that it must imply that we assign intrinsic moral value to additional lives
(which is a claim rejected by both Temkin and Parfit). Otherwise, how can we say
that z is not worse all things considered? If it is worse in one dimension and not
better in any, it seems like we have to accept that the mere addition of lives makes
the world worse. But that is also a claim rejected by Temkin and Parfit. Hence, we
have reached an impasse, and the only option seems to be to accept the intransitiv-
ity of the egalitarian perspective. Is that really the case? As I see it, an alternative
and more promising approach is to acknowledge that certain features of the alter-
natives (that some people exist in one alternative and not in the other) make them
incomparable, even though we can rank the alternatives along certain dimensions.52
In other words, to outweigh the badness of inequality in z compared to x, we need
not identify a respect in which z is better than x. It is sufficient to recognize the
respects which make them incomparable. And by adopting such a perspective, we
avoid intransitivity in the egalitarian perspective.
Of course, this does not prove that Temkin’s general claim is wrong. There might
be other cases to consider, and Temkin (1996) provides a discussion of some of them.
I will not elaborate on these cases, but rather turn to a discussion about the possible
meaning of an intransitive all things considered relation and how eventually to defend
transitivity. Some people find intransitivity meaningless, at least in a certain context
(Broome, 1991). They argue that the transitivity of a betterness relation is a truth of
logic, though they accept that there might be other (possibly intransitive) all things
considered relations. Temkin (1997) is not supportive of this line of reasoning.
“[A] conceptual defence of the axiom of transitivity is, I think, a
hollow victory. Such a defence succeeds only by robbing the axiom of its
force. If there is no way the axiom could fail to be true - by definition or
as a matter of ‘logic’ - then I fear it lacks substance. A linguistic truth
52This is not to say that it is never possible to provide an overall evaluation when some people
do not exist in both alternatives. Broome (1996) provides an interesting discussion in this respect.
My claim is simply that if the only difference between two states is the presence of some additional
lives, then it might be the case that these two alternatives are incomparable. Certainly, they are
incomparable for the persons in question, and thus it does not seem too implausible to argue that
this incomparability is carried over into the all things considered relation!
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that is unfalsifiable is trivial, and not a useful substantive principle for
guiding and assessing actions or beliefs” (p. 33).
I find myself sympathetic to this view, which also seems to be in line with the
spirit of Kolm (2000).
“Note that the economist’s use of naming rational the existence of
an ordering, of transitivity, or of a maximand is very particular. This
vocabulary was introduced for defending the hypothesis of maximizing
behavior of individuals, because this constitutes a very handy model and
these scholars did not see how to justify it...Remark that this sense of
the term rationality is an application of its basic standard sense of ‘for
a reason’ solely if one thinks that preferring a to b and b to c constitutes
a good reason for preferring a to c (p. 727, my emphasis).
Of course, it is possible to argue that logic provides such a reason. But that
does not seem to be what Kolm and Temkin have in mind. They want a substantive
defence of the transitivity condition. An outline of such a defence is presented by
Hurley (1989).
“To do what one think is best, all things considered, is to act in
accord with a view of the relationships among the relevant reasons for
action that promises to provide an orderly and consistent method of
proceeding when they conflict. But having the kind of reason such a
theory provides doesn’t make the reasons the theory is about any less
reasons for action...Although one should, all things considered, act in
accord with the theory, nevertheless the reasons the theory is about may
still conflict with the reasons the theory provides. Reasons for action
are pro tanto, not prima facie; they aren’t bits of evidence about what
should be done that yield to better more comprehensive evidence.
Suppose a sceptic about the authority of theory...asks: Why should I
act in accord with the theory rather than one of the conflicting reasons
it’s about? Does he suppose that an answer to this question might be
provided by yet another, higher-order reason, that will eliminate the
conflict? One should, all things considered, act in accord with the theory
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rather than in accord with one of the conflicting values the theory is
about: but the sense in which you should is just given the supposition
that it is the best account [my emphasis] of the relationships among the
values” (pp. 260-261).
This suggests a substantive defence of transitivity, because it does not rule out
the possibility that there might be better ways of proceeding when values are in
conflict. And even though there is a need for elaborating on the framework (which
it is beyond the scope of this paper to do), I find it appealing. In particular, I find
two features attractive. First, the reason-giving force of transitivity is not defended
by appealing to any reason-giving force of the concept of betterness (which would
violate the account of value outlined in section 2), and moreover the reason-giving
force of the conflicting values is retained within the theory. In any case, as the reader
will see, there is a close relationship between my discussion of the reported results
in previous sections and the framework of Hurley. Hence, I believe that the use of
transitivity can be defended in the present context, though it should be handled
with care.
Let us now turn to the second basic feature of my framework. I have appealed to
the badness of inequality as an input to egalitarian considerations about the good-
ness of different distributions. But there is a long tradition in economics arguing
that the badness of inequality can be interpreted more broadly, as a derivative of
any distributive sensitive all things considered relation. On the basis of this view,
Fleurbaey (2001) has argued that the distinction between egalitarianism and pri-
oritarianism vanishes. The idea is straightforward. On the basis of any prioritarian
rule, we can derive an inequality measure (satisfying the Pigou-Dalton condition)
such that the prioritarian rule can be considered the outcome of a process where we
weigh inequality and the average level of well-being. Hence, Fleurbaey suggests, a
prioritarian will always find an egalitarian on her side.
“In short, a prioritarian will always find an egalitarian who advocates
the same social ranking. When comparing distributions with the same
total amount of benefits, the prioritarian will agree with any egalitarian
who measures inequality with the same index that is implicit in the
prioritarian’s social ranking” (pp. 8-9).
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The problem is, however, that there will be no egalitarian supporting the pri-
oritarian inequality index, because this index is derived from prioritarian reasoning.
That means that it captures the idea of priority on the basis of absolute positions,
and not the egalitarian concern for relative positions. Hence, this change in repre-
sentation of prioritarianism does not make it equivalent to egalitarianism.53
A related argument has been suggested by (?, 2000), who claims that the fact
that we can represent prioritarianism in this way shows that the levelling down
objection cannot be used to make a distinction between egalitarianism and priori-
tarianism.54 If we view prioritarianism as the outcome of a process where we weigh
the badness of inequality and the average level of well-being in society, then (?,
2000) argues that it becomes clear that the levelling down objection applies to pri-
oritarianism as well. An arbitrary choice of representation cannot matter (op.cit., p.
15). We have already rejected the levelling down objection, but still this argument
is of some interest. In my view, it illustrates a fundamental mistake easily done by
economists when approaching the philosophical issues involved in this debate. The
philosophers are concerned with the different sets of reasons that can be used to
justify redistribution (see also Fleurbaey (2001, p. 1)), and this aim should be kept
in mind when introducing formal reasoning.55 In particular, any particular formal
representation in this context represents a particular set of reasons, and thus the
choice of representation is not at all arbitrary. Prioritarians do not appeal to equal-
ity directly whereas egalitarians do, and this distinction needs to be captured in
an appropriate representation of these positions. At least, if we want to discuss the
same set of issues as the philosophers.
8 Concluding Remarks
Isaiah Berlin once remarked that “[s]ome among the Great Goods cannot live to-
gether. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to choose, and every choice may
53Which is not to say that there are no cases where the egalitarian and prioritarian perspective
coincide on the overall conclusion or on the ranking of inequality. There are cases of agreement (as
discussed earlier), but still the perspectives will differ on how they defend any common conclusion.
54The argument in (?, 2000) is more elaborate, but I focus here on the part relevant for the
present discussion.
55By way of illustration, see Arneson (2000, p. 343), where he discusses the appropriateness of
the attitude of prioritarianism as expressed by the reasons that warrants its adoption.
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entail an irreparable loss” (Berlin, 1991, p. 13). In distributive justice, this truism
is easily seen, and it highlights the need for a careful examination of the various
reasons that may guide us in these hard choices. Economists and philosophers often
approach this task in different ways. Economists have mainly been concerned with
how different reasons fit together, whereas the philosophers to much greater extent
have explored the basis for the various reasons in question. This division of work
implies that there is much to learn from each other, if we manage to find a common
framework for discussion.
That is not easy, and I have to admit that I ran into many pitfalls when writing
this paper. The fact that the philosophers often approach the problem at a different
level of analysis makes many of the arguments hard to understand for an economist
(and I assume that the philosophers sometimes feel the same about the work of
economists). Nevertheless, there is a lot to learn from the philosophical literature
on egalitarianism, and in this paper I have made an attempt to survey some of the
main lessons and how they fit the economist’s way of thinking on these issues. Let
me briefly summarize. The most important issue in distributive justice is how much
priority to assign to the worse off, and the philosophical literature adds insight to this
issue by making a clear distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. It
turns out that the strength of your distributive preferences may depend on whether
you appeal to egalitarianism or prioritarianism. Egalitarians assign priority to the
worse off on the basis of relative positions, and this provides a strong case for absolute
priority to the worse off. By combining the philosophical argument with economic
reasoning, I showed that there is an extremely close link between equality promotion
and Rawlsian reasoning. The link to Rawlsian reasoning is not equally strong within
prioritarianism, but this framework allows for the inclusion of an absolute poverty
line in our distributive judgments. And such a poverty line is essential for most
people when discussing the extent of priority to assign to the worse off.
Moreover, the philosophical literature adds a lot of insight into how to defend
the separability condition frequently used by economists. This condition is in fact
of much practical importance, because if adopted it makes possible a decomposable
approach to policy considerations. Foster and Sen (1997) discuss this issue at some
length, but remarks that “even if one accept the usefulness of decomposability, one
might still wonder about its acceptability as a general condition” (p. 156). Within
the framework of an all things considered evaluation, prioritarianism provides one
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way of justifying decomposability. However, as discussed in section 4, this condition
can also be justified within an egalitarian framework, if we adopt unanimity as the
basis for our egalitarian concern.
I also believe that the philosophical literature on non-aggregative reasoning pro-
vides an extremely important reminder to economists, who easily forget that the
aggregative approach needs to be defended. However, as shown in section 6, the
main implication of the non-aggregative approach is that it provides another in-
teresting defence of the leximin principle. Finally, even though I am not convinced
by the arguments against the Pareto principle (or the general principle of personal
good) and transitivity, I have learned a lot from reading the critical literature on
these topics. Again, the literature makes clear that there is a need for an explicit
defence of these conditions, and to better understand the appropriate nature of this
defence is of course of much importance in itself.
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